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Abstract
We give a new class of security definitions for authentication in the quantum setting. These
definitions capture and strengthen existing definitions of security against quantum adversaries
for both classical message authentication codes (MACs) and well as full quantum state authen-
tication schemes. The main feature of our definitions is that they precisely characterize the
effective behavior of any adversary when the authentication protocol accepts, including corre-
lations with the key. Our definitions readily yield a host of desirable properties and interesting
consequences; for example, our security definition for full quantum state authentication im-
plies that the entire secret key can be re-used if the authentication protocol succeeds.
Next, we present several protocols satisfying our security definitions. We show that the
classical Wegman-Carter authentication scheme with 3-universal hashing is secure against su-
perposition attacks, as well as adversaries with quantum side information. We then present
conceptually simple constructions of full quantum state authentication.
Finally, we prove a lifting theorem which shows that, as long as a protocol can securely
authenticate the maximally entangled state, it can securely authenticate any state, even those
that are entangled with the adversary. Thus, this shows that protocols satisfying a fairly weak
form of authentication security automatically satisfy a stronger notion of security (in particular,
the definition of Dupuis, et al (2012)).
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1 Introduction
Authenticating messages is a fundamental operation in classical cryptography. A sender Alice
wishes to send a message m over an insecure channel to a receiver Bob, with the guarantee that
the message was not tampered with in transit. To accomplish this, Alice appends a “signature” σ
to m using a shared secret key k and send the message/signature pair (m, σ) to Bob. Bob receives
some potentially altered pair (m′, σ′), and then verifies that σ′ is a valid signature of m′ under
key k. If verification passes, Bob accepts m′, and if verification fails, Bob ignores the message and
discards it. A secure authentication protocol guarantees the following: even if the adversary has
arbitrarily tampered with the communication channel, as long as the adversary does not know
the secret key k, then either Bob rejects with high probability, or the message he receives is m.
Such a (symmetric key) authentication protocol is usually referred to as a Message Authentication
Code (MAC). As long as k is only used to authenticate a single message, information-theoretic
security can be achieved: no adversary – even a computationally unbounded one – can modify
the message without detection [WC81].
Just as authentication is a fundamental operation in classical cryptography, it will continue to
be an important tool in the coming age of quantum computers. In this work, we investigate au-
thentication in the quantum setting, and consider quantum attacks on both classical authentication
protocols, as well as full-fledged quantum protocols for authenticating quantum data. What kinds
of security guarantees can we hope for in the quantum setting? Various notions of security for
authentication schemes against quantum attacks have been considered in the literature. However,
as we will discuss below, these existing definitions do not fully capture security properties we
would expect of a secure authentication scheme.
The contribution of our paper is three-fold: first, we present new security definitions for au-
thentication in a quantum setting that strengthen previous definitions and address their limita-
tions. Second, we prove interesting consequences of our stronger security definition for quantum
authentication, such as information-theoretic key recycling and an easy protocol for quantum key
distribution. Finally, we prove that several natural authentication protocols satisfy our security
definitions.
1.1 Quantum Attacks on Classical Protocols.
A recent series of works [BDF+11, DFNS13, BZ13a, BZ13b, Zha12, KLLNP16] have studied quan-
tum superposition attacks on classical cryptosystems. In the setting of MACs, an adversary in
such an attack is able to trick the sender into signing a superposition of messages.1 That is, the
sender computes the map |m〉 7→ |m, σm〉 in superposition, where σm is the signature on m. The
adversary chooses some message superposition ∑m αm|m〉, and the sender then applies the map,
giving the adversary ∑m αm|m, σm〉. At this point, it is unclear what the security definition should
1One motivation for studying superposition attacks comes from the “Frozen Smart-Card” example [GHS15]: real-
world classical authentication systems are frequently implemented on small electronic devices such as RFID tags or
a smart-cards. A determined and sophisticated attacker in possession of such a smart-card could try to perform a
quantum “side-channel attack” on it: he places the device in a very low temperature environment, and attempts to
query the device in quantum superposition. One would like to guarantee that even then the attacker is unable to, say,
extract the secret key.
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actually be. Clearly, the adversary can tamper with the signed state: he can, for example, mea-
sure the entire state in the standard basis, obtaining the pair (m, σm) with probability |αm|2. Then
(m, σm) will pass verification, but will be different from the signed state the adversary received. If
the adversary can change the message state, what sort of guarantees can we hope for?
Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13a] give the first definition of security for classical authentication
against superposition attacks. They argue that, at a minimum, the adversary given a single signed
superposition should only be able to produce a single signed message; he should not be able
to simultaneously produce two valid signed messages (m, σm) and (m′, σm′) for m 6= m′. In the
classical setting, this requirement is equivalent to the traditional MAC security definition.
However, the Boneh-Zhandry definition has some unsatisfying properties. For example, con-
sider the case where the sender only signs messages that start with the email address of some
intended recipient, say, bob@gmail.com. Suppose the adversary tricks the sender into a signing
a superposition of messages that all begin with bob@gmail.com, but then manipulates the signed
superposition into a different superposition that includes valid signed messages that do not start
with bob@gmail.com. Clearly, this is an undesirable outcome. Unfortunately, the Boneh-Zhandry
definition does not rule out such attacks — it only disallows an adversary from producing q + 1
valid signed messages when given q signed superpositions. The situation illustrated here, how-
ever, is that the adversary is given one signed superposition, and now wants to produce one valid
signed message that was not part of the original superposition.
Along similar lines, suppose an adversary tricks the sender into signing a uniform super-
position on messages, and then produces a classical signed message (m, σ). From the sender’s
perspective, each message has weight 1|M| , where M is the message space. The sender cannot
prevent the adversary from measuring the message state to produce (m, σ) for a random m. How-
ever, it is reasonable to insist as a security requirement that the adversary cannot bias the out-
put of this measurement to obtain, say, (m∗, σm∗) with probability much higher than 1|M| . Again,
Boneh and Zhandry’s definition does not preclude such a biasing, since the adversary only ever
obtains a single signed message. Thus, the Boneh-Zhandry definition does not capture natural
non-malleability properties one would hope for from an authentication scheme.
Boneh and Zhandry’s definition suffers from these weaknesses because it only considers what
types of outputs the adversary can produce, ignoring the relationships between the output and
the original signed state. In the classical setting, the two approaches are actually equivalent, but
in the quantum setting this is not the case.
1.2 Quantum Authentication of Quantum Data.
We turn to the setting of schemes for authenticating quantum states. Barnum et al. [BCG+02]
was the first to study this, and they present a definition of non-interactive quantum authentica-
tion where, conditioned on the protocol succeeding, the sender has effectively teleported a quan-
tum state to the receiver (provided that the probability of success is not too small). They then
give a scheme (called the purity testing scheme) which attains this definition. Interestingly, they
also show that quantum state authentication also implies quantum state encryption.2 Subsequent
works [BCG+06, ABE10, DNS12, BGS13] presented some stronger security definitions that we will
2By contrast, in the classical setting, message authentication does not imply message encryption.
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discuss momentarily.
Roughly speaking, a (private-key) quantum authentication scheme is a pair of keyed quantum
operations (Authk,Verk), where k is a secret key shared by the sender and receiver, where Authk is
a map that takes in a quantum message state ρ, and outputs an authenticated state σ. The map
Verk is a verification operation that takes in a (possibly) tampered state σ˜ and outputs a state ρ˜,
along with a flag ACC or REJ indicating whether the verification succeeded or failed. These maps
are such that for all input states ρ and all keys k, we have Verk(Authk(ρ)) = ρ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|.
Barnum, et al. define an ε-secure authentication scheme to be such that for all pure message
states |ψ〉, for all adversary operations O, we have that
Tr
{(
(I− |ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|
)
τ
}
≤ ε (1)
where τ = 1|K| ∑k Verk(O(Authk(|ψ〉〈ψ|))) is the final state (including the ACC or REJ flag) after
authentication, adversary attack, and verification, averaged over the choice of secret key k. In-
formally, it states that either the receiver obtains a state that is close to |ψ〉, or rejects with high
probability. Barnum, et al. also extend this definition to the setting when the input state is not
pure but a mixed state ρ; it similarly guarantees that the final output state, conditioned on verifier
success, will be close to the input state ρ (provided that the success probability is not too small).
However, this security definition of [BCG+02] has some shortcomings.
Adversaries with quantum side information. It does not handle the case of when the adversary
has some quantum side information about the message state. Let (Authk,Verk) be some ε-secure
authentication scheme (according to the Barnum, et al. definition). Let M denote the sender’s
message register that is to be authenticated. Suppose the attacker has a qubit register Z such that
the joint state of the ZM registers is
1√
2
|0〉Z |ψ0〉M + 1√
2
|1〉Z |ψ1〉M
where |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are some orthogonal states. The adversary is thus entangled with the message
state, and the qubit Z is its side information about the message. Note that the marginal input
state (i.e. if we ignore the adversary’s qubit) is the probabilistic mixture ρ = 12 |ψ0〉〈ψ0|+ 12 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|.
Using the secret key k shared with the receiver, the sender applies Authk to M and transmits
the authenticated state across the channel. The adversary then performs the following attack:
controlled on the Z qubit, it forwards the authenticated message state untouched (if the Z qubit
is |0〉), and otherwise replaces the authenticated state with some fixed junk state |ξ〉 and sends
that instead (if the Z qubit is |1〉). When the receiver performs the verification operation, the junk
state will fail to pass with high probability, and thus conditioned on success (which occurs with
probability at least 1/2), the receiver will have a state close to |ψ0〉. However, this final state is far
from the original mixture ρ – violating the conclusion of the Barnum, et al. security condition. In
other words, the adversary significantly tampered with the message, but the receiver still accepted
with relatively large probability.
Being unable to handle adversaries with quantum side information prevents the security def-
inition from being composable. In many situations we would like to use authentication not as a
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stand-along task, but as a primitive in a larger protocol – indeed, quantum authentication has
been used as a primitive in schemes for delegated quantum computation, e.g., [ABE10, BGS13].
Here, the “adversary” (which may be other components of the protocol) may generate the inputs
to the authentication scheme, and thus be entangled with the message that is supposed to be au-
thenticated. If authentication scheme satisfied a composable security definition, then we may use
the security of the authentication primitive in a black box manner to argue the proper functioning
of the larger protocol.
Recently, several works [DNS12, BW16] have proposed composable security definitions for
quantum authentication – that is, they handle adversaries with quantum side information. How-
ever, their security definitions have the following drawback:
Averaging over the key. The security definitions of [BCG+02, DNS12, BW16] averages over the
secret key shared between the sender and receiver. Suppose Alice sends Bob the authenticated
state σk = Authk(ρ) using key k. Bob receives a (possibly tampered) state σ˜k, and proceeds to
verify the authentication. Let τk denote Bob’s state conditioned on successful verification. Roughly
speaking, the security definitions of [BCG+02, DNS12, BW16] refers to the average state Ek τk; in
particular, it states that Ek τk is close to the original state ρ. Even putting aside the example given
above (where the average state may not be close to ρ), this statement does not, by itself, imply
that τk is close to the original state ρ with high probability over k, which is a stronger property, and
quantifies how much the adversary learns about the secret key k. In other words, the definition
does not a priori rule out the possibility that each τk is far from ρ for every k, yet the average
happens to be ρ.
Later, we will show how taking into account the correlations between the key and the final
state of the protocol yields interesting consequences – such as the ability to reuse the key upon
successful verification. Furthermore, security definitions that average over the key are strictly
weaker than those that keep the key register (we give a brief argument for this in Section 3).
1.3 This Work
In this work, we address the above limitations by giving new security notions for authentication
in the quantum setting. More generally, we present an abstract framework of security for both
classical and quantum authentication schemes that not only captures existing security definitions
(such as the Boneh-Zhandry definition for classical protocols or the Barnum, et al. definition of
quantum state authentication), but also is more demanding in that it strongly characterizes the (ef-
fective) behavior of an adversary. In particular, the adversary may have access to quantum side
information with the message state that is being authenticated. The characterization of the adver-
sary’s admissable actions is what allows us to easily deduce many desirable security properties
(such as unforgeability, key reuse, and more). Furthermore, we will show that various natural
authentication protocols satisfy our security definitions.
Our abstract security framework is inspired by the simulation paradigm in classical cryptogra-
phy. In our framework, one first defines a classA of ideal adversaries. Intuitively, ideal adversaries
are those that cannot be avoided in a real execution of an ideal authentication protocol, such as
those that discard messages, or ones that carry out actions explicitly allowed by the protocol. For
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example, in the case of classical protocols, one can define the class of ideal adversaries to be ones
that “behave classically” on the message state – that is, they’re restricted to measurements in the
computational basis. In the case of quantum authentication, an ideal adversary can only act on the
side information, but otherwise acts as the identity on the authenticated message.
An authentication protocol P satisfies our security definition with respect to the class A if the
behavior of any adversary (not necessarily ideal) in the protocol P can be approximately simu-
lated by an ideal adversary in A . We take the most general notion of simulation possible: the
joint state of the secret key, the message state after the receiver’s verification procedure, and the
quantum side information held by the adversary conditioned on successful verification must be in-
distinguishable from the same joint state arising from the actions of some ideal adversary from the
class A . Since our notion of simulation is so general, this implies that our security definitions
satisfy security under sequential composition; that is, the authentication protocols that realize our
security definition can be securely composed with arbitary cryptographic protocols in a sequential
fashion.
We now discuss how security for both classical authentication schemes and fully quantum
authentication protocols can be defined in this framework.
1.3.1 A new security definition for classical authentication
The Boneh-Zhandry definition focuses on what classical signed messages an adversary can pro-
duce, treating the superposition access to the sender as a tool to mount stronger attacks. Here,
we instead think of a classical protocol giving rise to a weak form of authentication of quantum
messages, where a superposition is authenticated by classically signing each message in the super-
position. That is, a state ∑m αm|m〉 is authenticated as the state ∑m αm|m, σm〉. The state is similarly
verified in superposition by running the classical verification algorithm in superposition.
More generally, we think of the protocol acting on message states that may be entangled
with an adversary. For example, the sender could sign the M part of the state ∑m αm|m〉M ⊗
|ϕm〉Z , where the adversary has control of the |ϕm〉Z states. The signed state then would become
∑m αm|m, σm〉MT ⊗ |ϕm〉Z . Signing mixed states can also be expressed in this way, simply by puri-
fying the mixture. By thinking of the protocol in this way, we are able to give security definitions
that actually consider the relationship between the sender’s signed state and the final state the
adversary produces.
Clearly, such a classical scheme cannot fully protect the quantum state. An adversary could,
for example measure (m, σm), or any subset of bits of the state, and keep the result of such a
measurement in his own private space. This would not be detected by the classical verification
procedure, but the final message would have been changed.
Our security definition for classical protocols says that, roughly, an arbitrary adversary can
be simulated by an ideal adversary that can only do the following: perform some (partial) mea-
surement of the message in the computational basis, and controlled on the outcome of the partial
measurement, perform some quantum operation on his own private qubits. We also extend the
definition to handle side information the adversary may have about the message state; for ex-
ample, the adversary may possess the purification of the message state. Thus, our definition is
essentially the best one could hope for, since is disallows the adversary from doing anything other
than operations that are trivially possible on any classical protocol.
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Our definition readily implies the Boneh-Zhandry security definition for one-time MACs, and
does not suffer from the weakness of their definition3. Finally, we show that the classical Wegman-
Carter MAC that uses three-universal hashing is sufficient for achieving this strong security defi-
nition.
1.3.2 Definitions for Quantum Authentication
We next turn to quantum protocols for authenticating quantum messages. For general quantum
protocols, the adversary can always do the following. He can always act non-trivially on his own
private workspace – the verification procedure can never detect this. Otherwise, he can forward
the authenticated state as is, without recording any information about the state, or he can send
junk to the receiver. Our strongest definition of security – which we call total authentication – says
that this is essentially all an adversary can do in a secure quantum authentication protocol. In
other words, a real adversary in a total authentication protocol can be approximated by an ideal
adversary that behaves trivially on the authenticated state.
Our definition strengthens the definitions of [BCG+02, DNS12, BW16]: not only do we we
consider side information about the plaintext state, we also allow the receiver’s view to include
the authentication key as well as whatever information the adversary may learn about the key. The
ideal adversary must approximate the real adversary, even considering the entire key. In contrast,
existing definitions trace out the key — either partially or entirely — and therefore do not directly
consider arbitrary information the adversary may learn about the key. Our security definition of
total authentication thus rules out the possibility of the adversary learning significant information
about the key. This fact has interesting consequences:
1. Key reuse. For example, our definition immediately implies that, upon successful verifi-
cation by the receiver, the key can actually be completely recycled to authenticate a new
message. This is because, upon successful verification, the key is essentially independent
of the adversary and can therefore be used again in the same protocol. This is contrast to
the classical setting: in general keys cannot be recycled without computational assumptions.
Furthermore, no prior definition for authentication of quantum data directly implies key
re-usability, and no prior protocol for quantum messages gets full key re-usability upon suc-
cessful verification.
2. A simple quantum key distribution protocol. Our definition also gives a conceptually sim-
ple quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol4. Alice prepares a maximally entangled state,
chooses a random key k, and authenticates half the state with the key. She then sends the
authenticated half to Bob, keeping the unauthenticated half to herself. When Bob receives
the state, he sends a “received” message back to Alice, who then sends the key k to Bob.
Bob verifies the state using the key. Even though the adversary eventually sees the au-
thentication key k, he does not know the key when he intercepts the quantum state, and
must therefore interact with the state without the key. If Bob’s verification passes, it implies,
3One limitation of our definition is that we consider the signature registers as being initialized by the signer. Boneh
and Zhandry, in contrast, allow the registers to be initialized by the adversary, with the signature being XORed into the
registers
4The observation that quantum authentication implies a form of QKD is due to Charlie Bennett.
8
roughly, that the adversary could not have tampered with the state (by the security of total
authentication); in particular, the adversary could not have learned any information about
the maximally entangled state. Therefore, Alice and Bob measure their halves of the maxi-
mally entangled state and obtain a shared key that is unknown to the eavesdropper. If Bob’s
verification rejects, the two try again. Though this is not a practical QKD scheme (because
any tampering by the adversary would cause Alice and Bob to abort), it is conceptually very
simple and illustrates the power of our definitions.
A protocol satisfying total authentication. We exhibit a protocol meeting our strong security
notion. We present an authentication scheme based on unitary designs, which are efficiently sam-
pleable distributions over unitary matrices that behave much like the uniform distribution over
unitaries when only considering low degree moments.
Total authentication with key leakage. We also give a definition of total authentication with key
leakage. This is a notion of security where the real adversary can be simulated by an ideal trivial
adversary that only acts on its own private workspace, but in a manner that may depend on the key.
This is slightly weaker notion of security than total authentication, but it still implies simple QKD
and some amount of key reuse. We note that the work of [HLM11] essentially shows that the
Barnum et al. protocol satisfies total authentication with (minor) key leakage. We also give a
simple protocol that achieves this, based on the classical Wegman-Carter authentication scheme.
A lifting theorem. Finally, we prove an intriguing equivalence between a very weak form of au-
thentication security and a stronger notion. Specifically, this weak form of authentication security
only guarantees that an authentication scheme is able to authenticate a single state: a Bell state.
Furthermore, this Bell state is unentangled with the adversary, and the security guarantee holds
on average over the secret key. We prove a lifting theorem that “lifts” this weak security to a much
stronger one that shows the same authentication scheme, when augmented with a Pauli random-
ization step, is actually secure when authenticating arbitrary messages, which might be entangled
with the adversary! This stronger security notion still averages over the key, so it does not achieve
total authentication. Nonetheless, we find it conceptually very interesting that such a lifting theo-
rem holds.
Outline. In the next section we cover some preliminaries and notation. In Section 3 we formally
present the fundamental security definitions used in our paper. In Sections 4 and 5 we prove
that our definitions satisfy the properties expected of authentication schemes. In Section 6, we
analyze the security of the Wegman-Carter MAC with 3-universal hashing within our security
framework. In Section 7 we present and analyze the Auth-QFT-Auth scheme. In Section 8 we
present and analyze the unitary design scheme. In Section 9 we prove the lifting theorem.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Quantum information. We assume basic familiarity with quantum computing concepts, such
as states, measurements, and unitary operations. We will use caligraphic letters to denote Hilbert
spaces, such as H,M, T , K, and so on. We write S(H) to denote the set of unit vectors in H. For
two Hilbert spaces H andM, we write L(H,M) to denote the set of matrices that map H toM.
We abbreviate L(H,H) as simply L(H). The following are important subsets of L(H) that we’ll
use throughout this paper.
• D(H) denotes the set of density matrices on H; that is, positive semidefinite operators on H
with unit trace.
• D≤(H) denotes the set of subnormalized density matrices on H; that is, positive semidefinite
operators onH with trace at most one.
• U(H) denotes the set of unitary matrices acting on H. For an integer N, we will also write
U(N) to denote the set of all N × N complex unitary matrices.
Another important class of operators are isometries: these are like unitaries, except that can ap-
pend ancilla qubits. We say that a map V ∈ L(H,M) is an isometry if for all vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H,
‖V|ψ〉‖ = ‖|ψ〉‖. Note that this requires dim(M) ≥ dim(H). We will let J(H,M) denote the set
of isometries in L(H,M).
We use I to denote the identity matrix. For a Hilbert spaceH, we let |H| denote the dimension
ofH.
We will typically decorate states and unitaries with superscripts to denote which spaces they
act on. For example, let Y and Z be two Hilbert spaces. Let U ∈ U(Y) and let V ∈ U(Y ⊗ Z).
Then when we write the product UYVYZ we mean the (UY ⊗ IZ )VYZ ; we will often omit mention
of the identity unitary when it is clear from context.
Another convention is the implicit partial trace. For example, let ρKM ∈ D(K ⊗M). Then
ρM = TrK(ρKM). Additionally, given a pure state |ρ〉, we will let ρ denote the rank one density
matrix |ρ〉〈ρ|.
Superoperators. In this paper we will consider superoperators, which are linear maps that act on a
vector space of linear maps. For Hilbert spaces H andM, let T(H,M) denote the set of all linear
maps that take elements of L(H) to L(M). While superoperators can be very general, we will
focus on superoperators O ∈ T(H,M) that are completely positive and trace non-increasing, which
have the following characterization: there exists an alphabet Σ and set of matrices (not necessarily
Hermitian) {Aa}a∈Σ ⊂ L(H,M) such that
1. O(X) = ∑a∈Σ AaXA†a for all X ∈ L(H), and
2. ∑a∈Σ A†a Aa  IH.
For the rest of this paper, when we speak of superoperators, we will always mean completely
positive, trace non-increasing superoperators. Although the definition of superoperators is rather
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abstract, they capture general quantum operations on arbitrary quantum states, including post-
selection, as demonstrated by Stinespring’s dilation theorem:
Theorem 1 (Stinespring’s dilation theorem). A map O ∈ T(H,M) is a completely positive, trace
non-increasing superoperator if and only if there exists auxiliary Hilbert spaces Z ,Z ′, an isometry V ∈
J(H⊗Z ,M⊗Z ′), and a projector Π acting onM⊗Z ′ such that for all density matrices ρ ∈ D(H),
we have
O(ρ) = TrZ ′(ΠVρV†Π).
Matrix norms and distance measures. We will make use of several matrix norms and distance
measures in this paper.
Given a (not necessarily unit) vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, we use ‖|ψ〉‖2 to denote the Euclidean norm of
|ψ〉.
The most matrix norm important is the trace norm of a linear operator X, defined to be ‖X‖1 =
Tr(
√
X†X). Correspondingly, the trace distance between density matrices ρ, σ is defined to be ‖ρ−
σ‖1. The operational significance of the trace distance is that ‖ρ− σ‖1 denotes the maximum bias
with which one can distinguish between ρ and σ using any quantum operation.
The next norm we will make use of is the Frobenius norm of a linear operator X, which is defined
to be ‖X‖2 =
√
Tr(X†X). A useful property of the Frobenius norm is that ‖X‖2 =
√
∑ij |Xij|2,
where the sum is over all the matrix entries of X (with respect to any basis).
The operator norm (also known as the spectral norm) of an operator X ∈ L(H) is to defined to be
‖X‖∞ = sup|v〉∈S(H) ‖X|v〉‖2, where the supremum is over all unit vectors inH.
Fact 2. Let |ψ〉, |θ〉 ∈ S(H). Then
‖ψ− θ‖1 ≤ 2‖|ψ〉 − |θ〉‖2
where recall that ψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and θ = |θ〉〈θ|.
2.2 Basic definitions for authentication
Spaces. We let K denote the key space, M denote the message space, Y denote the authenti-
cated space, and F to denote the flag space. The flag space F is a two-dimensional Hilbert space
spanned by orthogonal states |ACC〉 and |REJ〉. The space Z is the private space of the adver-
sary. We will let S denote the a registers held by the sender and receiver that, during the execution
of the authentication protocol, are not communicated nor acted upon by the sender, receiver, or
adversary.
Authentication scheme. An authentication scheme is a pair of keyed superoperators Auth,Ver
where
• Authk for k ∈ K is a superoperator mapping D(M) to D(Y).
• Verk for k ∈ K is a superoperator mapping D(Y) to D(M⊗F ).
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satisfying the correctness requirements that for any quantum state ρ ∈ D(M), for all keys k ∈ K,
Verk(Authk(ρ)) = ρ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|.
We will also use Auth and Ver to denote the operators
Auth(·) =∑
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ Authk(·) Ver(·) =∑
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ Verk(·).
Some simplifying assumptions. This definition of authentication scheme is more general than
we need in this paper. Throughout this work, we shall work with a simplified model of authenti-
cation schemes: first, we will assume that Authk behaves as an isometry takingM to Y (i.e. it isn’t
probabilistic). Let Vk denote the subspace of the Hilbert space Y that is the image of Authk, let ΠVk
denote the projector onto the space Vk, and let Auth−1k denote the inverse isometry that maps Vk to
M. In this case, a canonical way to define the Verk superoperator is as follows:
ρ 7→ (Auth−1k ◦ΠVk)(ρ)⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|F + Tr((I−ΠVk) ρ) IM|M| ⊗ |REJ〉〈REJ|F (2)
Here, Auth−1k ◦ΠVk denotes the operation that first applies the projection ΠVk to the state, fol-
lowed by the inverse isometry Auth−1k . The state
IM
|M| is the maximally mixed state on the message
space. In other words, the verification procedure first checks that the received state (which resides
in Y) is supported on the subspace of valid signed states Vk. If so, then it inverts the authentica-
tion isometry to obtain an unsigned message state, and sets the F register to |ACC〉. Otherwise, it
replaces the state with a uniformly random message state, and sets the F register to |REJ〉.
However in this paper we are mostly concerned with the output of the Verk procedure in the
accepting case. For technical convenience then, throughout this paper we will treat Verk as the
following superoperator mapping D(Y) to D(M):
Verk(ρ) =
(
Auth−1k ◦ΠVk
)
(ρ).
In other words, it only outputs the |ACC〉 part of (2), and does not output a ACC or REJ flag.
Furthermore, notice that this superoperator is not trace preserving; the trace of Verk(ρ) is equal
to the probability that ρ was accepted by the verification procedure defined in (2). Thus one can
view Verk as a “filter” that only accepts states that were properly authenticated.
We stress, however, that these simplifying assumptions are not crucial to our results – it is
mostly for notational convenience that we treat Verk as a filter.
Classical Authentication. In a classical authentication protocol, the authentication operatorAuthk
is specified by a classical function Authk : M 7→ Y acting on the computational basis, run in su-
perposition on the input state. The verification operator behaves the same as described above:
Verk projects onto the subspace of Y spanned by classical strings Authk(m) for all m ∈ M, and
then applies the inverse map Auth−1k .
Message authentication codes. A message authentication code (or MAC) is special type of clas-
sical authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) where for a message m, Authk(m) = (m, σ(k, m)), where
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we call σ(k, m) the message tag. We treat Verk as an operator that projects out messages that do not
have valid tags, and for messages with valid tags, Verk will strip the tags away:
Verk =∑
m
|m〉〈m, σ(k, m)|.
Adversaries. We model adversaries in the following way: the adversary prepares the initial mes-
sage state |ρ〉MSZ , where we can assume that the adversary possesses the purification of ρMS .
After the state is authenticated with a secret key k, the adversary gets to attack the YZ spaces
with an arbitrary completely positive trace non-increasing superoperator O. After this attack, the
state is un-authenticated with the same key k.
We don’t require the superoperator O to be trace preserving; this is to allow adversaries to dis-
card certain measurement outcomes (or, alternatively, post-select on measurement outcomes, with-
out renormalizing). While this may seem to give the adversary far too much power, in our security
definitions we take into account the probability of the event that the adversary post-selects on. If
this probability is too small, the security guarantees are meaningless, which is necessary. Allowing
for superoperators to be trace non-preserving will help make our definitions clean to state.
A remark about the sender and receiver’s private register S . The reader may wonder why we
do not allow the sender, receiver, nor adversary to act upon the S register during the execution
of the authentication protocol. The register S is supposed to model entanglement the sender and
receiver may keep during the protocol. The important aspect of it is that the adversary does not
have access to this side information.
If, when analyzing the authentication scheme in the context of a larger protocol in which the
sender/receiver do act upon the register S , we can assume that during the authentication phase,
the sender and receiver do not touch S , but wait until the authentication protocol is over. Thus
we can analyze the behavior of the authentication protocol without this action.
3 Security Framework for Quantum Authentication
We present our security definitions using the real/ideal paradigm. Let (Auth,Ver) be an authenti-
cation protocol, with key space K, message spaceM, and authenticated space Y .
Definition 3. Let (Auth,Ver) be an authentication scheme. Let A ⊆ T(YZ ,YZ) denote a set of ideal
adversaries. The scheme (Auth,Ver) is ε-reduces to A -adversaries iff the following holds: for all initial
message states |ρ〉MSZ , for all adversaries O ∈ T(YZ ,YZ), there exists an ideal adversary I ∈ A such
that the following (not necessarily normalized) states are ε-close in trace distance:
• (Real experiment) Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ [Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ )
• (Ideal experiment) Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ [Verk ◦ I ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ )
where Authk acts onM, Verk acts on Y , and both act as the identity on SZ .
Intuitively, our security definition states that for an authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) that is
A -secure, for all initial message states ρMSZ , an arbitrary adversary that acts on an authenticated
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state Authk(ρMSZ ) is reduced to an “ideal adversary” in A ; behaving differently will cause the
verification procedure to abort. In other words, “all the adversary can do” is behave like some
adversary in the class A .
A comment about normalization. It is important that the states of the real experiment and ideal
experiment are not requiried to have unit trace. This is because their trace corresponds to the
probability that the verification procedure accepts. If the probability of acceptance is smaller than
ε, then the security guarantee is vacuous. Intuitively, this corresponds to situations such as the
adversary successfully guessing the secret key k, so we cannot expect any security guarantee in
that setting. However, if the probability of acceptance is significantly larger than ε, then we can
condition on acceptance, and still obtain a meaningful security guarantee: the distance between
the (renormalized) real experiment and ideal experiments is small.
We now specialize the above definition to some important classes of ideal adversaries that we
will consider in this paper. Note that for two classes of ideal adversaries A and A ′, if A ⊂ A ′,
then an authentication scheme reducing to A -adversaries implies reducing to A ′-adversaries.
Hence reducing to A -adversaries is a stronger security guarantee.
3.1 Basis-dependent authentication
We first define a notion of security of authentication schemes that reduce to a basis-respecting ad-
versary.
Definition 4 (Basis-respecting adversaries). Let B = {|ψ〉} denote an orthonormal basis for Y . Then
an adversary I ∈ T(YZ ,YZ) is B-respecting iff it can be written as
I(σ) = TrZ ′(ΠVσV†Π)
for all σ ∈ D(YZ), where Π is a projector acting on ZZ ′, and V ∈ J(YZ ,YZZ ′) is an isometry that can
be written as
V = ∑
ψ∈B
|ψ〉〈ψ|Y ⊗Vψ
where for each ψ, Vψ ∈ J(Z ,ZZ ′) is some isometry.
Without the second condition on V, by Stinespring’s Dilation Theorem every superoperator
can be written as I(σ) = TrZ ′(ΠVσV†Π) for some choice of isometry V and projector Π. How-
ever, the second condition forces V to respect the basis B. Intuitively, a basis-respecting adversary
first performs some (partial) measurement on the Y register in the B basis, and based on the mea-
surement outcome, performs some further isometry on the side information in Z . When B is
simply the computational basis, then the adversary treats the Y register as classical.
Definition 5 (Security relative to a basis). Let B be a basis for Y . An authentication scheme (Auth,Ver)
ε-authenticates relative to basis B iff it ε-reduces to the class of B-respecting adversaries.
Intuitively, our new definition captures the “best possible” security definition for classical au-
thentication protocols. With a classical protocol, the adversary can perform arbitrary measure-
ments on the authenticated space without detection by the verification algorithm. Because mea-
surements are now undetectable, the adversary can also perform σ-dependent operations to the
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auxiliary registers, where σ is the classical authenticated message observed in the authenticated
registers. For example, he can copy σ into the auxiliary space. He can also now choose to abort or
not depending on σ. However, he should not be able to turn σ into σ′ 6= σ.
In Section 4, we establish consequences of our definition of basis-dependent security, including
the property of unforgeability: the adversary cannot produce two valid signed messages with
non-negligible probability, when given access to only one superposition. Thus, our definition
subsumes the Boneh-Zhandry security definition for one-time MACs.
In Section 6 we show that the classical Wegman-Carter MAC where the message m is appended
with h(m), where h(·) is drawn from a three-wise independent hash family, is a scheme that au-
thenticates relative to the computational basis.
Theorem 6. The Wegman-Carter MAC with three-universal hashing is O(
√|M|/|T |)-authenticating
relative to the computational basis, where T is the range of the hash family.
3.2 Total authentication
In this section we formally define our notion of total authentication. First, we define oblivious
adversaries.
Definition 7 (Oblivious adversary). An adversary I ∈ T(YZ ,YZ) is oblivious iff there exists a
superoperator O ∈ T(Z ,Z) such that
I(σ) = (IY ⊗O)(σ)
for all σ ∈ D(YZ).
In other words, an oblivious adversary does not act at all on the authenticated message, and
only acts on the auxiliary side information that it possesses about the state.
Definition 8 (Total authentication). An authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) ε-totally authenticates iff
it ε-reduces to the class of oblivious adversaries.
This generalizes the security definition of [DNS12], which is similar, except it traces out the key
register. Therefore, it does not keep track of potential correlations between the adversary and the
key. We will argue shortly that our definition of total authentication is strictly stronger than the
definition of [DNS12]; that is, there are protocols which satisfy the security definition of [DNS12],
but do not satisfy total authentication.
In Section 5 we establish a few properties of this definition. The first is that a totally authenti-
cating scheme yields encryption of the quantum state. Barnum, et al. showed that quantum state
authentication implies quantum state encryption [BCG+02]. However, they did not take into ac-
count quantum side information. We show that our definition very easily implies encryption even
when the adversary may be entangled with the message state.
Then, we show how our notion of total authentication gives rise to a conceptually simple ver-
sion of quantum key distribution (QKD). [HLM11] have already observed that the universal com-
posability of the Barnum et al. protocol implies that it can be used to perform QKD as well. Thus
while our application of quantum authentication to QKD is not novel, we use this as another
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opportunity to showcase the strength of our definition. We also show how our definition easily
implies full key reuse.
In Section 8 we present a scheme achieves total authentication, and to our knowledge this is
the first scheme that achieves such security.
Theorem 9. The unitary design scheme is 2−s/2-totally authenticating, where s is the number of extra |0〉
qubits.
As a consequence, this yields an authentication scheme where the key can be recycled fully,
conditioned on successful verification by the receiver. In contrast, the protocol of Barnum et al.
is not known to possess this property; [HLM11] showed that most of the key can be securely
recycled.
3.3 Total authentication with key leakage
Finally, we introduce a slight weakening of the definition of total authentication above: we con-
sider schemes that achieve total authentication of quantum data, but incur some key leakage. We
model this in the following way: let K′ be such that |K|′ ≤ |K|. Define a key leakage function
` : K 7→ K′. If |K′| is strictly smaller than |K|, then `(k) must necessarily lose information about
the key k ∈ K, but it will also leak some information about it.
In a total authentication scheme with key leakage, an arbitrary adversary is reduced to an
oblivious adversary (i.e., is forced to only act on the side information), but the manner in which it
acts on the side information may depend on `(k).
Definition 10 (Authentication with key leakage). Let (Auth,Ver) be an authentication scheme. Let K′
be some domain such that |K′| ≤ |K| and let ` : K → K′ be a key leakage function. LetA ⊆ T(YZ ,YZ)
denote a set of ideal adversaries. The scheme (Auth,Ver) ε-reduces to A -adversaries with key leakage
` iff the following holds: for all initial message states |ρ〉MSZ , for all adversaries O ∈ T(YZ ,YZ),
there exists a collection of ideal adversaries {Ih} ⊂ A , indexed by h ∈ K′, such that the following (not
necessarily normalized) states are ε-close in trace distance:
• (Real experiment) Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ [Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ )
• (Ideal experiment) Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗
[
Verk ◦ I`(k) ◦ Authk
]
(ρMSZ ).
Definition 11 (Total authentication with key leakage). Let K′ be some domain such that |K′| ≤ |K|
and let ` : K → K′ be a key leakage function. An authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) ε-totally authenti-
cates with key leakeage ` iff it ε-reduces to the class of oblivious adversaries with key leakeage `.
This definition may seem somewhat strange: how is an ideal adversary able to learn bits `(k)
of the key k, if it doesn’t act on the authenticated part of the state at all? Of course, any adversary
that learns something about the key must have acted on the authenticated state, but the point is
that, conditioned on successful verification, the adversary “effectively” behaved like an oblivious
adversary that had access to `(k).
In Section 7 we present a very simple scheme that achieves total authentication with some
key leakage: to authenticate an arbitrary quantum state ρ, first apply the classical Wegman-Carter
authentication scheme on it using key k. Then, apply H⊗n to all the qubits in the authenticated
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state (i.e. apply the quantum Fourier transform over Z2). Finally, apply the classical Wegman-
Carter scheme again using a fresh key h. Thus, we are authenticating the state ρ in complementary
bases. We call this the “Auth-QFT-Auth” scheme.
We will show that this in fact achieves total authentication (and hence encryption of the state),
but at the cost of leaking the “outer key” h:
Theorem 12 (Security of the Auth-QFT-Auth scheme). The Auth-QFT-Auth scheme is δ-totally au-
thenticating with outer key leakage, where δ = O(
√|M|5/2/|Y|).
While this scheme leaks some bits of the outer key, it preserves the secrecy of the state ρ and
the “inner key” k. Furthermore, it is much more “lightweight” than the full unitary design scheme
that achieves total authentication without key leakage. It also illustrates that applying a simple
classical authentication scheme in complementary bases is already enough to reduce a full quan-
tum adversary to performing only trivial attacks. Finally, the analysis of this scheme crucially
relies on the basis dependent security definition above.
3.4 A remark about efficiency
Recently, Broadbent and Wainewright [BW16] study the efficiency of the simulating ideal adver-
saries in the security proofs of two authentication schemes, the Clifford scheme and the trap code
scheme. Specifically, they show that if the adversary in the authentication protocol is a quantum
computer that runs in time T, then the ideal adversary which simulates it also runs in time O(T).
This efficiency-preservation is important for notions of composable security.
We note that the constructions of the ideal adversary in our analysis of the Wegman-Carter
scheme, the Auth-QFT-Auth scheme, and the unitary design scheme are also efficiency preserving,
and hence if the arbitrary adversary runs in polynomial time, then the simulating adversary also
runs in polynomial time.
3.5 Comparison with security definition in [DNS12]
Similarly to our definition, the security definition of message authentication [DNS12] implies that
essentially all the adversary can do is act on its own private workspace. However, it traces out
the key register, and thus it does not keep track of correlations between the adversary and the
secret key. It is a natural question to ask whether the security definition of [DNS12] implies our
definition of total authentication. Here we show that it cannot, because there are protocols that
satisfy the [DNS12] definition, but not ours.5
Consider a protocol (Auth,Ver) that satisfies the [DNS12] definition. Let k denote the secret key
used in the protocol. Now consider the following modified protocol (Auth′,Ver′): to authenticate
a message state ρ, it produces Authk(ρ), but then appends an independently random bit b, where
(k, b) is the secret key register of (Auth′,Ver′). To verify, the receiver just applies the Verk operation,
and ignores the last bit. This new protocol still satisfies the [DNS12] definition, because the extra
bit b is independent of the (Auth,Ver) process, and thus final state of the protocol can be simulated
by an ideal adversary that generates its own b bit – as long as we’re tracing out the key. However,
this protocol does not satisfy total authentication. This is because an adversary can simply copy
5See Section 9 for a formal statement of the [DNS12] definition.
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the the bit b into its private workspace; but this cannot be simulated by an ideal adversary that is
unentangled with the (k, b) register.
Furthermore, any authentication scheme satisfying [DNS12]’s security definition also satisfies
”total authentication with key leakage” for some key leakage function ` and any authentication
scheme satisfying ”total authentication with key leakage” satisfies the key-averaged security def-
inition. Hence, these two security definitions are equivalent (up to some error).
4 Properties of basis-dependent authentication
4.1 Indistinguishability from measured
Here, we show that any classical scheme that authenticates relative to the computational basis im-
plies that the authenticated state is indistinguishable from being measured in the computational
basis. For concreteness we will work with the computational basis; this is without loss of general-
ity.
Theorem 13. Let ε < 1/2. If (Authk,Verk) ε-authenticates relative to the computational basis, then the
following two states are 7
√
ε-close:
• Ek Authk(ρMSZ ) (the unmeasured authenticated state), and
• Ek [Meas ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ ) (the measured authenticated state),
where Meas denotes measuring Y in the computational basis, and Authk and Meas both act as the identity
on SZ .
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction: assuming an adversary can distinguish from mea-
sured, we will obtain a violation of the security of authentication. Let ρMSZ be the input quan-
tum state to the protocol. Let D be a distinguisher violating the indistinguishability from mea-
sured property. Suppose D has very large distinguishing advantage 1− γ (we deal with the low-
distinguishing advantage later). This means that
• D(Ek Authk(ρMSZ )) outputs 1 with probability at least 1− γ, and
• D(Ek [Meas ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ )) outputs 1 with probability at most γ
Now suppose we set up the following state, where S ′ is an extra qubit register:
1
2
[
|0〉〈0|S ′ ⊗Meas(ρMSZ ) + |1〉〈1|S ′ ⊗ ρMSZ
]
.
In other words, the S ′ qubit indicates whether we have measuredM in the computational basis or
not. Next we authenticate this state using Authk. Since the scheme is classical, authentication com-
mutes with measurement in the computational basis. Therefore, the authenticated state, averaged
over the key k, is
1
2
[
|0〉〈0|S ′ ⊗E
k
(Meas ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ ) + |1〉〈1|S ′ ⊗E
k
Authk(ρ
MSZ )
]
. (3)
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We now apply the distinguisher D to this state, which acts on registers YZ , and saves its output to
a qubit register Z ′. Because D has high distinguishing advantage, applying D and conditioning
on D giving the right answer only negligibly affects the state. Therefore, the resulting state is
4
√
2γ-close to:
1
2
[
|0〉〈0|S ′ ⊗E
k
(Meas ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ )⊗ |0〉〈0|Z ′ + |1〉〈1|S ′ ⊗E
k
Authk(ρ
MSZ )⊗ |1〉〈1|Z ′
]
. (4)
Now, this state will pass verification with probability 1, since the authentication scheme is classi-
cal. Furthermore, since the authentication scheme is classically secure, the final state in line (4) can
be approximated by a basis-respecting ideal adversary I acting on the state in line (3):
1
2
[
|0〉〈0|S ′ ⊗E
k
(Meas ◦ I ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ ) + |1〉〈1|S ′ ⊗E
k
(I ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ )
]
. (5)
Here, we used the fact that I andMeas commute, because I is basis-respecting. Let τMSZZ ′k denote
(I ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ ). Then we have that Ek Meas(τk) ≈2ε Ek(Meas ◦ Authk)(ρMSZ )⊗ |0〉〈0|Z ′ and
Ek τk ≈2ε Ek Authk(ρMSZ ) ⊗ |1〉〈1|Z ′ . However this implies that Ek τZ ′k is both 2ε close to |0〉〈0|
and |1〉〈1| simultaneously, which is absurd when ε < 1/2 — we have reached a contradiction.
Thus, we have that if the scheme 12 − 4
√
2γ-authenticates in the computational basis, there is no
distinguisher with advantage 1− γ.
Next, we show how to boost a low-advantage distinguisher for a scheme (Auth,Ver) into a
high-advantage distinguisher for the product scheme (Autht,Vert) which acts on message space
Mt by applying Auth to each message component with an independent key.
A simple hybrid argument shows that, if (Auth,Ver) ε-authenticates in the computational basis,
then (Autht,Vert) tε-authenticates in the computational basis. Note that Barnum et al.’s proof
of this required somewhat more effort; however, for us, due to the fact that we consider side
information in our definition, in our case the security of the product scheme comes essentially for
free.
Next, assume D distinguishes from measured for the state ρMSZ in the scheme (Auth,Ver)
with advantage δ. Then we can boost the success probability to a distinguisher Dt for the state
(ρMSZ )⊗t in scheme (Autht,Vert) with advantage 1− 2e−tδ2/2. But from the above, this means
that the scheme (Autht,Vert) cannot 12 − 8e−tδ
2/4-authenticate. Thus,
tε >
1
2
− 8e−tδ2/4
Choosing t = 1/3ε gives δ < 7
√
ε.
4.2 Unforgeability
In this section we show that our security definition of authentication schemes relative to a basis
implies the classical security definition of authentication schemes – namely, that the adversary,
after having received the authenticated message state, cannot produce two distinct authenticated
message-tag pairs with non-negligible probability. This property is called unforgeability. Thus
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this shows that our security definition recovers the Boneh-Zhandry security definition for one-
time MACs.
Our model for signature forgery is the following. Let (Auth,Ver) be a classical authentication
scheme that is B-respecting for some basis. We will let B be the computational basis without loss of
generality. Furthermore, we will restrict our attention to MACs where for a classical message m ∈
M, Authk(m) = (m, σ(k, m)), although our arguments extend to general classical authentication
schemes.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the initial message state is a pure state |ρ〉MZ =
∑m αm|m〉M⊗ |ϕm〉Z where the |ϕm〉 are arbitary pure states held by the adversary6. After signing,
we have
τKYZ = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ Authk(ρMZ ).
The adversary applies some superoperator E on YZ and outputs a system on Y1Y2Z . The spaces
Y1 and Y2 are both isomorphic to Y . Let the tampered state be denoted as
τ˜KY1Y2Z = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ E(Authk(ρMZ )).
We define the probability of forgery by E on input ρ to be the probability that, upon measur-
ing K, Y1, and Y2 in the computational basis, we obtain a key k and two valid signed messages
(m, σ(k, m)) and (m′, σ(k, m′)) with m 6= m′.
The next theorem shows that quantum-secure authentication schemes possess the unforgeabil-
ity property. The idea of the proof is as follows: suppose that there was an authentication scheme
(Auth,Ver), an adversary E and an initial message state ρM such that E on input ρ could forge
an authenticated message with non-negligible probability. Using the fact that the authentication
scheme is secure, we can in fact find a fixed message m ∈ M and another adversary Ê that, when
given an authentication of message m, forges a valid signed message (m′, σ(k, m′)) where m′ 6= m
with non-negligible probability. The definition of secure authentication scheme easily implies this
is impossible.
Theorem 14. Let (Auth,Ver) be an authentication scheme that is ε-authenticating relative to the compu-
tational basis. Let E be a forger. Then for all initial message states ρMZ , the probability of forgery by E on
input ρ is at most 3ε.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that the probability of forgery is at least δ = 3ε. Since the scheme
is ε-authenticating relative to the computational basis, we can simulate the forger by an ideal
adversary I that respects the computational basis: on input τKYZ (the authentication of ρ), it first
measures the Y register to yield a valid signed message (m, σ(k, m)). Then, conditioned on this
result, it applies an arbitrary quantum operation on the Z register. Since E is a forger, the ideal
adversary I is also a forger: measuring KYZ in the computational basis will yield k, (m, σ(k, m))
and (m′, σ(k, m′)) where m 6= m′ with probability at least δ− ε = 2ε. Let Em denote the event that
measuring Y yields a valid signature of the message m. Let Fm denote the event that measuring Z
yields a valid signature of a message that’s distinct from m.
6For notational simplicity we omit mention of the sender/receiver’s private space S ; our arguments proceed simi-
larly when we take it into account.
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Thus
∑
m
Pr[Em] · Pr[Fm|Em] ≥ 2ε
where the probabilities are with respect to the ideal adversary I . Thus by averaging there exists
an m where Pr[Fm|Em] ≥ 2ε. But notice that Pr[Em] is independent of the key, and simply |αm|2,
because the ideal adversary only measures the Y register of τ in the computational basis. Thus, if
we condition the state I(τ) on the event Em, we have the following state:
I(τKYZ )∣∣Em = Ek |k〉〈k|K ⊗ |m, σ(k, m)〉〈m, σ(k, m)|Y ⊗ Im,σ(k,m) (|ϕm〉〈ϕm|Z)
where Im,σ(k,m) denotes the attack that the ideal adversary performs on the side information,
conditioned on reading (m, σ(k, m)) in Y . However, Pr[Fm|Em] ≥ 2ε implies that measuring
Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ Im,σ(k,m)
(|ϕm〉〈ϕm|Z) in the computational basis yields k and a forgery (m′, σ(k, m′))
where m′ 6= m with probability at least 2ε. However, this is impossible, as (m, σ(k, m)) should
have negligible information about a valid signature of m′.
5 Properties of total authentication
5.1 Encryption
Analogous to the Barnum et al.’s [BCG+02] result that authentication implies encryption, we show
that authentication when considering side information must encrypt the state, even to an adver-
sary that may be entangled with the state. This result is compatible with Barnum et al.’s: we
start from a stronger property that considers side information, and end with a stronger form of
authentication that also considers side information.
Theorem 15. If (Auth,Ver) ε-totally authenticating, then for any two states ρMZ0 , ρMZ1 such that ρ
Z
0 and
ρZ1 are δ-close, the following two states are δ+ 14
√
ε close:
• Ek Authk(ρMZ0 ) and
• Ek Authk(ρMZ1 )
We remark that the conclusion here is the same as q-IND-CPA security of quantum encryption
schemes, as defined by [BJ15].
Proof. First, we observe that any scheme that gives ε secure encryption in the case δ = 0 gives
2ε+ δ secure encryption in the general case. Indeed, by assumption, Ek Authk(ρMZ0 ) is ε-close to
Ek Authk(|0〉〈0|)⊗ ρZ0 , which is δ close to Ek Authk(|0〉〈0|)⊗ ρZ1 , which is ε close to Ek Authk(ρMZ1 ).
Therefore, it suffices to prove that Auth is 7
√
ε secure for states with δ = 0.
Our proof will closely follow the proof of Theorem 13. We prove this theorem by contradiction:
assuming an adversary can distinguish the two states, we will obtain a violation of the security of
total authentication. Let ρMZ0 , ρMZ1 be quantum states. Suppose D is a distinguisher such that
• D(Ek Authk(ρMZ1 )) outputs 1 with probability at least 1− γ, and
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• D(Ek Authk(ρMZ0 )) outputs 1 with probability at most γ
We set up the state 12 |0〉〈0|S ⊗ ρMZ0 + 12 |1〉〈1|S ⊗ ρMZ1 where S is a private qubit register. Next,
we authenticate and then apply the distinguisher D, saving its output to an auxiliary qubit register
Z ′. The subsequent state is thus 4√2γ-close to
1
2
[
|0〉〈0|S ⊗E
k
Authk(ρ
MZ
0 )⊗ |0〉〈0|Z
′
+ |1〉〈1|S ⊗E
k
Authk(ρ
MZ
1 )⊗ |1〉〈1|Z
′
]
. (6)
Now, this state will pass verification with probability 1. Therefore, since (Auth,Ver) is a secure
total authentication scheme, this state is approximated by an oblivious adversary I that only acts
on Z of the authenticated state 12 |0〉〈0|S ⊗ Authk(ρMZ0 ) + 12 |1〉〈1|S ⊗ Authk(ρMZ1 ). However, since
ρZ0 = ρZ1 , the Z register of this state is independent of whether the S qubit is 0 or 1. Therefore
the output of the ideal adversary I must be at least 1/2-far from the state given in line (6), which
is a contradiction if 4
√
2γ > 1/2. Thus, we have that if the scheme is 12 − 4
√
2γ-totally authen-
ticating, there is no distinguisher with advantage 1− γ. Finally, we can boost a low-advantage-
distinguisher for the scheme (Auth,Ver) into a high-advantage distinguisher in the same way as
in Theorem 13, and obtain the conclusion for all distinguishers.
5.2 Quantum Key Distribution
Suppose we have a total authentication scheme. Then as argued in the Introduction, we imme-
diately get a simple method to perform quantum key distribution. However, the QKD scheme
sketched in the Introduction is rather fragile: any small amount of tampering by the adversary
will cause Alice and Bob to abort. Here we sketch a slightly more robust way of carrying out QKD
using a total authentication scheme.
Suppose Alice and Bob want to generate n bits of perfectly correlated key bits. We now describe
a protocol that takes 2 rounds and O(n log n) bits of communication, and tolerates the adversary
attacking at most O(n/ log n) fraction of the qubits of communication. If this is the case, then
Alice and Bob can distill at least Ω(n) bits of shared key. Let (Auth,Ver) be a scheme that encodes
single qubits as O(log n) qubits, and is ε-totally authenticating for ε = n−Ω(1). The unitary design
scheme is one such example.
The QKD protocol is as follows:
1. Alice prepares the maximally entangled state over 2n qubits i.e. |Φ〉AB = 1√
2n ∑x∈{0,1}n |xx〉
AB .
2. Alice will generate independent keys k1, . . . , kn for n uses of the authentication scheme
(Auth,Ver). She authenticates each of the n qubits on the B-half of |Φ〉AB using an inde-
pendent key. She sends B to Bob.
3. Bob sends a bit to Alice acknowledging that he received some state through the quantum
channel (that may have been tampered by the adversary).
4. Alice sends the keys k1, . . . , kn over an authenticated, but non-private, classical channel.
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5. On the quantum state he received, Bob performs the verification procedure Verk1 ⊗ · · ·Verkn
on n parts of log n qubits each. He relays to Alice which parts successfully passed verifica-
tion. Let S ⊂ [n] denote the successfully unauthenticated qubits.
6. Alice and Bob measure the part of their respective states corresponding to S in the compu-
tational basis, and use these bits as their shared key.
Since (Auth,Ver) is totally authenticating, after Bob successfully unauthenticates the qubits in
S, the qubits shared between Alice and Bob in S will be ≈ εn-close to the maximally entangled
state. Thus when they both measure, they will both share keys (x, x′) that are εn-close to uniform,
perfectly correlated, and private from any other system (because the maximally entangled state
is in tensor product with any other quantum system). If we assume that the probability that
Bob successfully verifies is not too small, then this means that Alice and Bob have successfully
performed quantum key distribution.
5.3 Key Reuse
It is easy to see that our definition of total authentication implies that, conditioned on successful
verification of an authentication scheme (satisfying total authentication), the key can be reused by
the sender and receiver for some other purpose. This is because conditioned on the acceptance,
the final state of the adversary is within ε/α trace distance of being independent of the key, where
α is the probability of acceptance in the authentication protocol.
6 Quantum MACs from 3-universal hashing
In the classical setting, secure one-time MACs can be constructed via universal hashing. Let {hk}k
be a strongly (2-)universal hash family. Then it is well known that the classical authenticiation
protocol Authk(m) = (m, hk(m)) is secure against classical adversaries [WC81]. Here, we show
that the same authentication protocol is also quantum-secure, provided that the hash family {hk}k
satisfies the following: for all distinct m1, m2, m3, the distribution of (hk(m1), hk(m2), hk(m3)) for a
randomly chosen k ∈ K is uniform in T 3. Such a family is called a 3-universal hash family. We will
overload notation and use k(·) to denote the function hk(·).
We note that Boneh and Zhandry showed that, when authenticating classical messages in the
one-time setting, pairwise independence is sufficient to ensure that a quantum adversary cannot
forge a new signed message, as long as the length of the tag is longer than the message! When the
tag is shorter than the message, they showed that pairwise independence is insecure, and 3-wise
independence is necessary.
Our analysis of the 3-wise independent Wegman-Carter MAC requires that, in order to obtain
security against quantum side information, the message tag needs to be longer than the message.
Thus it is conceivable that pairwise independence is sufficient for the same guarantee; we leave
this as an open question.
Theorem 16. Let K = {k} be a 3-universal hash family. Let Authk(m) = (m, k(m)) and Verk be
the corresponding verification function. Then the authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) is O(
√|M|/|T |)-
authenticating relative to the computational basis.
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Before beginning the proof we first state what the implications for key length are. Suppose we
wish to guarantee that the Wegman-Carter MAC is ε-authenticating relative to the computational
basis, then |M|/|T | ≤ O(ε2), which implies that log |T | ≥ log |M|+ 2 log 1ε +O(1). To ensure
three-wise independence, it is sufficient for the key to have length 3 log |M|+ 6 log 1ε +O(1).
Proof. To prove this, we need to show that for all message states ρMSZ and all adversaries E ∈
T(YZ ,YZ), the result of the QMAC is to reduce the action of the adversary on the authenticated
message to an ideal, computational basis-respecting adversary.
We will concentrate on the case of signing pure state messages – this is because we can al-
ways purify the initial message state, and give the purification to the adversary. Furthermore, for
simplicity we will consider the case where the register S (corresponding to the sender/receiver’s
private space) is empty. In other words, we will show that Wegman-Carter MAC is a quantum
secure MAC when the initial message state is a state |ρ〉MZ = ∑m αm|m〉M ⊗ |ϕm〉Z . The register
M corresponds to the message, and the register Z is held by the adversary. At the end we will
discuss how the proof generalizes to the case of non-empty S .
It will be convenient to work with the Schmidt decomposition of |ρ〉, which we write as
|ρ〉MZ =∑
z
√
λz
(
∑
m
αzm|m〉M
)
⊗ |ϕz〉Z
where for z 6= z′, we have 〈ϕz|ϕz′〉 = 0, and the λz’s are nonnegative numbers summing to 1.
Furthermore, the dimension of the span of {|ϕz〉}z is at most |M|.
After signing, the state becomes
σKYZ = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ Authk(ρ)
where Y =MT . Now consider an attack E of the adversary. By Stinespring’s Dilation Theorem,
the superoperator E can be implemented by applying a unitary V on registers YZ , as well as
some auxiliary register Z ′ held by the adversary, followed by a projective measurement P on
ZZ ′, followed by tracing out Z ′.
First, we will assume that the auxiliary space Z ′ is part of the purification in |ρ〉MZ . Secondly,
we will ignore the projector P for now, and handle it later.
We specify the action of V on YZ as
V : |m, t〉MT ⊗ |ϕz〉Z 7→ |ψmtz〉MT Z
where {|ψmtz〉} are a collection of states inMT Z such that for all (m, t, z) 6= (m′, t′, z′), 〈ψmtz|ψm′t′z′〉 =
0. Furthermore, write the states as follows:
|ψmtz〉 =∑
a,b
βmtzab |a, b〉 ⊗ |φmtzab 〉
where the {|φmtzab 〉} are an arbitrary collection of unit vectors residing in the space Z , and |a, b〉 are
vectors in Y =MT . Therefore after the attack we have
σ˜KYZ = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗V Authk(ρ)V†.
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Now we apply the verification procedure to this state to obtain τ, where we’ve conditioned on the
procedure accepting:
τKYZ = Ver(σ˜KYZ ) = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ Verk
(
V Authk(ρ)V†
)
Note that τ does not have unit trace in general (because the verification procedure Verk may not
pass with probability 1). For a fixed key k, we can write
|τk〉 = Verk V Authk|ρ〉 = ∑
z,m,a
√
λzαzmβ
mkmz
aka
|a〉M ⊗ |φmkmzaka 〉
T
where we abbreviate k(m) and k(a) by km and ka respectively. We can decompose the vector
|τk〉 = |τk,ideal〉+ |τk,err〉 where
|τk,ideal〉MT Z =∑
z,m
√
λzαzmβ
mkmz
mkm
|m〉M ⊗ |φmkmzmkm 〉
Z
(7)
|τk,err〉MT Z = ∑
z,m,a:a 6=m
√
λzαzmβ
mkmz
aka
|a〉M ⊗ |φmkmzaka 〉
Z
(8)
Thus τKYZ = τideal + τerr where
τideal = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ |τk,ideal〉〈τk,ideal |,
and let
τerr = E
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ (|τk,ideal〉〈τk,err|+ |τk,err〉〈τk,ideal |+ |τk,err〉〈τk,err|) .
The τideal represents the part of τ that looks like it underwent an ideal attack, while the term τideal
represents the rest of τ. We will bound this error term and show that its size is small within τ, and
thus this will show that τ is close to the result of an ideal attack.
To bound the size of τerr, we note that
‖τerr‖1 ≤ E
k
[2‖ |τk,ideal〉〈τk,err| ‖1 + ‖ |τk,err〉〈τk,err| ‖1]
= E
k
[
2
√
〈τk,err|τk,err〉 · 〈τk,ideal |τk,ideal〉+ 〈τk,err|τk,err〉
]
≤ 3E
k
√
〈τk,err|τk,err〉
≤ 3
√
E
k
〈τk,err|τk,err〉
where in the equality we used that for two pure states |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉, ‖ |ϕ〉〈ψ| ‖1 =
√〈ϕ|ϕ〉 · 〈ψ|ψ〉.
In the second-to-last inequality we used that 〈τk,ideal |τk,ideal〉 ≤ 1, and in the last inequality we used
the concavity of the square-root function. Now,
E
k
〈τk,err|τk,err〉 = E
k
∑
z,z′
a,m,m′ :a/∈{m,m′}
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ · βmkmzaka β
m′km′ z′
aka · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
aka
|φmkmzaka 〉 (9)
= ∑
z,z′
a,m,m′ :a/∈{m,m′}
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ ·
(
E
k
βmkmzaka β
m′km′ z′
aka · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
aka
|φmkmzaka 〉
)
(10)
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Observe that, for every a, m, m′ such that a /∈ {m, m′}, ka is independent of km and km′ (this is
where we use 3-wise independence of k). Therefore, we can write
E
k
βmkmzaka β
m′km′ z′
aka · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
aka
|φmkmzaka 〉 = Ek,h β
mkmz
aha
β
m′km′ z′
aha · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
aha
|φmkmzaha 〉
where the expectation on the right hand side is over two independent hash families k and h. We
have equality because (km, km′ , ka) and (km, km′ , ha) are identically distributed.
This motivates us to define
ξ1 = E
k,h
∑
z,z′,m,m′
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ · βmkmzmhm β
m′km′ z′
mhm · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
mhm
|φmkmzmhm 〉
ξ2 = E
k,h
∑
z,z′,m
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m · βmkmzmhm β
mkmz′
mhm · 〈φmkmz
′
mhm
|φmkmzmhm 〉.
We will momentarily show that ξ1 and ξ2 are small in magnitude. Assuming this, we add ξ1 and
ξ2 to (10) to get a nicer-looking sum:
(10) + ξ1 + ξ1 − ξ2 = ∑
z,z′
a,m,m′
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ ·
(
E
k,h
βmkmzaha β
m′km′ z′
aha · 〈φ
m′km′ z′
aha
|φmkmzaha 〉
)
(11)
=
1
|T | ∑z,z′,m,m′
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ ·E
k
∑
a,b
βmkmzab β
m′km′ z′
ab · 〈φm
′km′ z′
ab |φmkmzab 〉 (12)
=
1
|T |∑z,m
λz · |αzm|2E
k
∑
a,b
|βmkmzab |2 (13)
=
1
|T | . (14)
To go from the second line to the third line we used the orthogonality conditions
〈ψm′t′z′ |ψmtz〉 =∑
a,b
βmtzab β
m′t′z′
ab 〈φm
′t′z′
ab |φmtzab 〉 = 0
whenever (m, t, z) 6= (m′, t′, z′).
Now we bound the magnitudes of ξ1 and ξ2. We use Cauchy-Schwarz repeatedly to bound
|ξ1|:
|ξ1| = 1|T |
∣∣∣∣∣Ek ∑z,z′,m,m′
√
λzλz′ · αzmαz′m′ ·∑
b
βmkmzmb β
m′km′ z′
mb · 〈φm
′km′ z′
mb |φmkmzmb 〉
∣∣∣∣∣ (15)
≤ 1|T | Ek
√√√√ ∑
z,z′,m,m′
|αzm|2|αz′m′ |2 ·
∣∣∣∣∣∑b βmkmzmb βm
′km′ z′
mb · 〈φm
′km′ z′
mb |φmkmzmb 〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(16)
≤ 1|T | Ek
√√√√ ∑
z,z′,m,m′
|αzm|2|αz′m′ |2 ·
(
∑
b
|βmkmzmb |2 · ‖|φmkmzmb 〉‖2
)(
∑
b
|βm′km′ z′mb |2 · ‖|φ
m′km′ z′
mb 〉‖2
)
(17)
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≤ 1|T | Ek
√√√√ ∑
z,z′,m,m′
|αzm|2|αz′m′ |2 ·
(
∑
a,b
|βmkmzab |2 · ‖|φmkmzab 〉‖2
)(
∑
a,b
|βm′km′ z′ab |2 · ‖|φ
m′km′ z′
ab 〉‖2
)
(18)
≤ 1|T | Ek
√
∑
z,z′,m,m′
|αzm|2|αz′m′ |2 · 2 (19)
≤
√
2
|M|
|T | . (20)
In the last line, we used the fact that the dimension of the span of the |ϕz〉’s is at most |M|. A
similar calculation will show that |ξ2| ≤
√
2|M|/|T | as well. Putting everything together, we get
that ∣∣∣∣Ek 〈τk,err|τk,err〉
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1+ 3√2)|M|/|T |.
This implies that
‖τ − τideal‖1 ≤ 3
√
6|M|/|T |.
Recall that we have ignored the final projector P that the real adversary E may have applied after
applying the unitary V. Since P acts on Z only, it commutes with the verification operation, and
thus we have that
‖PτP† − Pτideal P†‖1 ≤ 3
√
6|M|/|T |.
where PτP† = Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ Verk ◦ E ◦ Authk(ρMZ ), the true final state of the protocol. Applying
Auth−1k on L.H.S. doesn’t increase the distance.
Finally, we have to argue that Pτideal P† is actually equal to Ek |k〉〈k| ⊗ΠVk ◦ I ◦Authk(ρMZ ) for
some computational basis-respecting adversary I . The ideal adversary behaves as follows when
given the YZ registers of σKYZ :
1. The adversary prepares auxiliary registers M′T ′Z2 in the |0 · · · 0〉 state. The Y ′ = M′T ′
registers are isomorphic toMT , and Z2 is a qubit register.
2. First the ideal adversary makes a copy of theMT registers in the computational basis and
coherently stores the copy in auxiliary registersM′T ′.
3. The ideal adversary then applies the original adversary unitary V to registersM′T ′Z .
4. The adversary checks whether the values of the MT and M′T ′ registers are the same in
the computational basis; if so, the Z2 qubit is set to |0〉, and the M′T ′ registers are set to
|0 · · · 0〉. Otherwise, it is kept at |1〉. In other words, the basis vector |m, t, m′, t′, 0〉MTM′T ′Z2
is mapped to |m, t, 0 · · · 0〉MTM′T ′Z2 iff m = m′ and t = t′.
5. The adversary measures the Z2 qubit register, and the Z register using the POVM element
{P, I− P}, and accepts only on outcome |0〉 for Z2 and P for Z .
Observe that this ideal attack I can be implemented as
I : σYZ 7→ TrY ′Z2
(
(P⊗ |0〉〈0|Z2)VidealσYZV†ideal(P⊗ |0〉〈0|Z2)
)
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where Videal is an isometry mapping the space YZ to the space YY ′ZZ2, P⊗ |0〉〈0|Z2 is a projec-
tor acting on ZZ2, and TrY ′Z2(·) is the partial trace over system Y ′Z2. Furthermore, Videal is an
isometry that leaves theMT registers unchanged, and hence is a computational basis-respecting
adversary. Observe that PτKYZideal P
† = ΠVk
(I(σKYZ )).
Thus we have shown how the final state of the protocol can be simulated by an ideal adversary,
when the input state is of the form |ρMZ 〉. What about the case when the state is of the form
|ρMSZ 〉? The previous analysis works exactly the same, where we bundle together S and Z as the
adversary space, but we make the simple observation that here the ideal adversary constructed
above would act as the identity on S .
Thus we have established the simulation of every adversary by an ideal adversary for every
input state |ρMSZ 〉, so this implies that (Auth,Ver) is O(√M/T)-authenticating relative to the
computational basis.
7 Total authentication (with key leakage) from complementary classi-
cal authentication
In the previous section, we saw how the classical Wegman-Carter message authentication scheme
is still secure even when used on a superposition of messages, and even if the adversary has access
to quantum side information about the messages. Here, we will show that using the Wegman-
Carter scheme as a primitive, we obtain total quantum state authentication, which implies encryption
of the quantum state.
The quantum state authentication scheme is simple: the sender authenticates the message state
using the Wegman-Carter MAC in the computational basis, and then authenticates again in the
Fourier basis (using a new key). The verification procedure is the reverse of this: the receiver
first checks the outer authentication, performs the inverse Fourier transform, and then checks the
inner authentication. We call this the “Auth-QFT-Auth” scheme. This is pleasingly analogous to
the quantum one-time pad (QOTP), which encrypts quantum data using the classical one-time
pad in complementary bases. However, the QOTP does not have authentication properties. Our
analysis requires the 3-wise independence property of the Wegman-Carter MAC.
There is one slight caveat: we show that Auth-QFT-Auth achieves total authentication with key
leakage. That is, we argue that conditioned on the receiver verification succeeding, the effect of an
arbitrary adversary is to have ignored the authenticated state, and only act on the adversary’s side
information, in a manner that may depend on the key used for the second authentication (what
we call the “outer key”). In other words, we sacrifice the secrecy of the outer key, but in exchange
we get complete quantum state encryption.
7.1 The Auth-QFT-Auth scheme
Let |ρ〉MZ = ∑m αm|m〉M ⊗ |ϕm〉Z be the initial message state, where Z is held by the adversary.
Just like in the proof of Theorem 16, we will omit mention of the sender/receiver’s private space
S , and discuss how our proof generalizes to the case of non-empty S later.
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Again, it will be advantageous to rewrite this state in terms of the Schmidt decomposition:
|ρ〉MZ =∑
z
√
λz
(
∑
m
αzm|m〉M
)
⊗ |ϕz〉Z
where for z 6= z′, we have 〈ϕz|ϕz′〉 = 0, and the λz’s are nonnegative numbers summing to 1.
Furthermore, the dimension of the span of {|ϕz〉}z is at most |M|.
The authentication scheme is the composed operation Auth2(H⊗N(Auth1(ρ))), where Auth1 is
the inner authentication scheme that uses key k, H⊗N is the quantum Fourier transform over Z2,
and Auth2 is the outer authentication that uses key h. The keys k and h are independent.
The inner authentication scheme Auth1 mapsM to Y1 =MT1. We define N = |Y1|. H is the
single-qubit Hadamard unitary, and the Fourier transform H⊗N acts on Y1. The outer authenti-
cation scheme Auth2 maps Y1 to Y2 = MT1T2. The keys k and h live in the registers K and H,
respectively. The evolution of the initial message state is as follows:
1. Inner authentication. When the inner authentication key (henceforth called the inner key) is
k, the state becomes
∑
z
√
λz
(
∑
m
αzm|m, k(m)〉Y1
)
⊗ |ϕz〉Z
2. Fourier transform over Z2: Let {|x〉} be a basis for Y1. Then:
1√
N
∑
z
√
λz
(
∑
m,x
αzm(−1)(m,k(m))·x|x〉Y1
)
⊗ |ϕz〉Z .
3. Outer authentication. The outer key is denoted by h. The final authenticated state is then
|σkh〉YT2Z = 1√
N
∑
z
√
λz
(
∑
m,x
αzm(−1)(m,k(m))·x|x, h(x)〉Y1T2
)
⊗ |ϕz〉Z
where T2 is the space of the tag h(x).
Let
σKHY1T2Z = E
kh
|kh〉〈kh|KH ⊗ |σkh〉〈σkh|Y1T2Z .
The adversary is then given the Y1T2 registers of σ, and performs a general unitary attack V that
acts on Y1T2Z :
σ˜KHY1T2Z = VσV†.
Let τ˜KHMZ = Ver1 ◦QFT−1 ◦Ver2(σ˜). Let the inner authentication scheme be the 3-wise indepen-
dent hashing QMAC with tag length log T, and message length log M. Let the outer authentication
scheme be a QMAC that ε-authenticates with respect to the computational basis.
The Auth-QFT-Auth scheme can potentially leak some bits of the outer key h, but we will show
that this is the only thing that is leaked; otherwise, it is performs total authentication (and hence
encryption).
Theorem 17 (Security of the Auth-QFT-Auth scheme). The Auth-QFT-Auth scheme is δ-totally au-
thenticating with outer key leakage, where δ = ε+O(
√|M|3/2/|T1|).
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Again before starting the proof we consider the key requirements. The outer authentication
scheme need not be a Wegman-Carter MAC, but let’s assume that it is. In order to achieve δ-
total authentication, the inner MAC must be such that |M|3/2/|T1| ≤ O(δ2), or in other words,
log |T1| ≥ 32 log |M|+ 2 log 1δ +O(1). The key needed for the inner MAC must be at least 92 log |M|+
6 log 1δ + O(1). The “message length” that is given to the outer MAC is log |M| + log |T1| ≥
5
2 log |M|+ 2 log 1δ +O(1), and thus log |T2| ≥ 52 log |M|+ 4 log 1δ +O(1). The key length for the
outer MAC needs to be at least 152 log |M|+ 12 log 1δ +O(1), so the total key needed is 12 log |M|+
18 log 1δ +O(1).
While the inner key can be recycled (upon successful verification), the outer key unfortunately
cannot be.
Proof. We will let M = |M|, T = |T1|, and N = MT = |Y1|. We will assume that M3/2 ≤ T;
otherwise the theorem statement is vacuous.
Suppose the outer authentication scheme was ε-secure. By definition, there exists an ideal
computational basis adversary I such that ‖Ver2(σ˜)− Ver2(I(σ))‖1 ≤ ε, where Ver2 denotes the
verification procedure for the outer authentication scheme. There exists a computational basis-
respecting linear map Λ ∈ L(Y2Z) such that
I : σ 7→ ΛσΛ†.
Since Λ is computational basis-respecting, we have for all (x, s, z):
Λ|x, s〉Y1T2 ⊗ |ϕz〉Z = |x, s〉Y1T2 ⊗ |φxsz〉Z .
for some collection of (not necessarily normalized) states {|φxsz〉}.
Therefore the effect of the adversary on the authenticated state (after verification) is to be close
to I(σ) = Ek,h |kh〉〈kh| ⊗ |τkh〉〈τkh| where for fixed inner/outer keys k, h
|τkh〉 = 1√
(N)
∑
z
√
λz∑
m,x
αzm(−1)(m,k(m))·x|x〉 ⊗ |φxhxz〉.
Thus, the final state that Bob has, after performing full (i.e. inner and outer) verification, is ε-close
to
E
k,h
|kh〉〈kh| ⊗ |µkh〉〈µkh|
where
|µkh〉 =∑
z
√
λz∑
m
(
1
N ∑x,m′
αzm′(−1)(m+m′,k(m)+k(m′))·x
)
|m〉 ⊗ |φxhxz〉.
Then security of Auth-QFT-Auth is established if we show that for every h,
E
k
‖|µkh〉 − |νh〉‖2
is small, where
|νh〉MZ =∑
z
√
λz∑
m
αzm|m〉M ⊗ |ηhz〉Z
with |ηhz〉Z = 1N ∑x |φxhxz〉Z . Assuming this, the next Lemma will show that there is an ideal
oblivious, but outer key-dependent, adversary whose actions lead to the global stateEkh |kh〉〈kh| ⊗
|νh〉〈νh|.
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Lemma 18 (Constructing the ideal oblivious adversary). For all h there exists an ideal oblivious ad-
versary Ih acting on Z only such that
|νh〉〈νh|MZ = Ih(|ρ〉〈ρ|MZ ).
Proof. We now construct an ideal adversary Ih, derived from the computational basis adversary I .
By definition of I , there exists a computational basis-respecting isometry V ∈ J(Y2Z ,Y2ZY ′2Z2)
where Y ′2 is an auxiliary register isomorphic to Y2, and Z2 is an auxiliary qubit register, such that
I : σYZ 7→ TrY ′Z2
(
ΠVσYZV†Π
)
.
Here Π = P⊗ |0〉〈0|Z2 for some projector P acting on Z . Furthermore, V is computational basis
respecting:
ΠV|x, s〉Y2 ⊗ |ϕz〉Z = |x, s〉Y2 ⊗ |φxsz〉Z ⊗ |0 · · · 0〉Y
′
2Z2
where the |φxsz〉Z were defined above.
Now we construct the ideal general adversary Ih as follows:
1. First, the adversary creates the entangled state |Φh〉AA
′
= 1√
N ∑x |x, h(x)〉
A|x, h(x)〉A′ in new
registers A⊗A′, which are isomorphic to Y2 ⊗Y2, and {|x〉} is a basis for Y1.
2. It then applies the unitary V to half of |Φh〉AA
′
that resides in A, and the Z part of the input
state |ρ〉.
3. The adversary measuresAA′ZZ2 using the projective measurement {Q, I−Q}, where Q =
|Φh〉〈Φh|AA′ ⊗Π. The adversary discards the outcome corresponding to I− Q, and leaves
the state unnormalized:
1
N ∑z,x,m
√
λzαzm|m〉M |φxsz〉Z |Φ〉AA
′ |0 · · · 0〉Y ′2Z2
4. The adversary discards the AA′Y ′2Z2 registers:
1
N ∑z,x,m
√
λzαzm|m〉M ⊗ |φxsz〉Z
This is precisely the state |νh〉, and the Ih only interacts with Z and auxiliary registers in the
adversary’s control, so it is an ideal general adversary.
We now turn to bounding Ek ‖|µkh〉 − |νh〉‖2:
E
k
‖|µkh〉 − |νh〉‖2
=
1
N2
E
k
∑
m,z,z′
√
λzλz′ ∑
x′,x′′,m′,m′′
m/∈{m′,m′′}
αz′m′αzm′′(−1)(m+m′,k(m)+k(m′))·x′(−1)(m+m′′,k(m)+k(m′′))·x′′〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′z〉
=
1
N2 ∑m,z,z′
x′,x′′,m′,m′′
m/∈{m′,m′′}
√
λzλz′αz′m′αzm′′(−1)(m+m′)·x′1+(m+m′′)·x′′1 〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′z〉Ek (−1)
(k(m)+k(m′))·x′2(−1)(k(m)+k(m′′))·x′′2 .
We use the abbreviation |φhxz〉 = |φxhxz〉. In the second line, we divided x into two parts (x1, x2),
where x1 corresponds toM, and x2 corresponds to T1. We focus on the expectation χm,m′,m′′,x′2,x′′2 =
Ek(−1)(k(m)+k(m′))·x′2(−1)(k(m)+k(m′′))·x′′2 . We consider two cases:
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Case 1: m′ = m′′, m′ 6= m. Then χm,m′,m′′,x′2,x′′2 = 0 if x′2 6= x′′2 , otherwise χm,m′,m′′,x′2,x′′2 = 1.
1
N2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑z,z′,x′,x′′m,m′ :m 6=m′
√
λzλz′αz′m′αzm′(−1)(m+m′)·(x′1+x′′1 )〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′z〉χm,m′,m′,x′,x′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
N2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑z,z′,x′,x′′1
m,m′ :m 6=m′
√
λzλz′αz′m′αzm′(−1)(m+m′)·(x′1+x′′1 )〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′1 x′2z〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N2 ∑z,z′
√
λzλz′
√√√√√ ∑
m 6=m′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑x′,x′′1 (−1)(m+m
′)·(x′1+x′′1 )〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′1 x′2z〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ 1
N2 ∑z,z′
√
λzλz′
√
∑
m,m′
∑
x′,x′′1 ,x˜′,x˜
′′
1
(−1)(m+m′)·(x′1+x′′1+x˜′1+x˜′′1 )〈φhx˜′′1 x˜′2z|φ
h
x˜′z′〉〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′1 x′2z〉
=
1
N2 ∑z,z′
√
λzλz′
√√√√M2 ∑
x′,x′′1 ,x˜
′,x˜′′1
x′1+x
′′
1+x˜
′
1+x˜
′′
1=0
〈φhx˜′′1 x˜′2z|φ
h
x˜′z′〉〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′1 x′2z〉
≤ 1
N2 ∑z,z′
√
λzλz′
√
M3N2
≤ M
5/2
N
(at most M z’s)
=
M3/2
T
.
Case 2: m, m′, m′′ are all distinct. Then χm,m′,m′′,x′2,x′′2 = 0 unless x
′
2 = x
′′
2 = 0, in which case
χm,m′,m′′,x′2,x′′2 = 1. This uses the three-independence of k(·).
1
N2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑z,z′,x′,x′′m,m′,m′′ distinct
√
λzλz′αz′m′αzm′(−1)(m+m′)·x′1+(m+m′′)·x′′1 〈φhx′z′ |φhx′′z〉χm,m′,m′′,x′,x′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
N2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑z,z′,x′1,x′′1
m,m′,m′′ distinct
√
λzλz′αz′m′αzm′(−1)(m+m′)·x′1+(m+m′′)·x′′1 〈φhx′10z′ |φ
h
x′′1 0z
〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N2 ∑z,z′
√
λzλz′
√√√√√ ∑
m,m′,m′′ distinct
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑x′1,x′′1 (−1)(m+m
′)·x′1+(m+m′′)·x′′1 〈φhx′10z′ |φ
h
x′′1 0z
〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ M
9/2
N2
≤ M
3/2
T
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where we used the fact that M3/2 ≤ T. Therefore, for every h we have
E
k
‖|µkh〉 − |νh〉‖2 = O(M3/2/T)
as desired. Using Fact 2 and Jensen’s inequality, Ekh ‖|µkh〉〈µkh| − |νh〉〈νh|‖ ≤ O(
√
M3/2/T).
Thus, the final state of Bob is ε+O(
√
M3/2/T)-close to
E
kh
|kh〉〈kh| ⊗ |νh〉〈νh| = E
kh
|kh〉〈kh| ⊗ Ih(|ρ〉〈ρ|)
where Ih are the ideal adversaries given by Lemma 18.
To conclude the theorem, we now observe that when S is non-empty, we can use the same
analysis as above where we bundle together S and Z as a joint adversary register, and the ideal
adversary given by Lemma 18 will act as the identity on the S register. This establishes that
(Auth,Ver) is a total authentication scheme with outer key leakage.
8 Total authentication from approximate unitary designs
We now present a scheme that satisfies the strongest security definition, that of total authentica-
tion (without any key leakage). In particular, this implies complete reuse of the entire key. This
property of complete reuse of the key was not known before; it is not known whether the entire
key can be reused in the authentication scheme of Barnum, et al [BCG+02].
This scheme is based on unitary designs, which are in some sense the quantum analogue of
t-wise independent hash functions: a t-unitary design (also simply called a t-design) is a distribu-
tionD over unitary matrices such that degree t polynomials cannot distinguish between a unitary
drawn from D and a fully random unitary. Furthermore, there are constructions of efficient uni-
tary designs [BHH12].
8.1 The unitary design scheme
We call this scheme the unitary design scheme. Let s be a security parameter. The input state is
|ρ〉MZ , where the Z register is held by the adversary.
1. The sender Alice first appends s |0〉 qubits in an auxiliary T register.
2. Using her secret key k, Alice samples a random unitary Uk drawn from an (approximate)
unitary t-design that acts jointly onM⊗T . We will set the parameter t = 8.
3. Alice applies Uk to the M⊗ T register, and sends M⊗ T across the quantum channel to
Bob.
4. Bob receives some state, and applies the inverse unitary U†k to it. He measures the last s
qubits and accepts if they all measure to be 0. Otherwise he rejects.
Theorem 19. The unitary design scheme is efficiently computable, and is 2−s/2-totally authenticating.
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This scheme is inspired by the Clifford code authentication scheme, first proposed by Aharonov,
et al. [ABE10], and further analyzed in [DNS12, BW16]. Our protocol is exactly the same, except
the ensemble of unitaries, instead of being an approximate 8-design, is the Clifford group, which is
a well-studied set of unitaries that are central to quantum error-correction, simulation, and more.
It was also recently shown that the Clifford group is a 3-unitary design [Web15, Zhu15]7. [DNS12,
BW16] show that the Clifford authentication scheme is secure even against entangled adversaries;
however, as mentioned before, their security guarantee does not take into account the key.
Our unitary design scheme is also very similar to the non-malleable quantum encryption scheme
proposed by Ambainis, Bouda, and Winter [ABW09], wherein a unitary 2-design is used to en-
crypt a quantum state. However, non-malleable quantum encryption does not imply authentica-
tion.
We now remark upon the key requirements of the unitary design scheme. Constructions of
approximate unitary 8-designs acting on n qubits involve choosing a random quantum circuit of
size Θ(n2), and thus the randomness required is Θ(n2) [BHH12]. This asymptotically matches
the randomness requirements required of the Clifford scheme described above, but is much larger
than the randomness requirements of the purity-testing-based protocol of [HLM11], which uses
Θ(n) bits of key to authenticate an n-qubit quantum state.
Notation and useful lemmas. We set up some notation. We letM denote the message space, T
to denote the space of the dummy zero qubits. We let Y = M⊗T . We let M = |M|, |T | = 2s,
and N = M2s = |Y|.
Let E be an adversary acting on Y ⊗Z . By the Stinespring representation theorem, there exists
a unitary V acting on a possibly larger space Y ⊗Z ⊗Z ′, followed by a projection P that acts on
ZZ ′, followed by a partial trace over Z ′. However without loss of generality we shall simply treat
this additional space Z ′ as part of Z , and ignore the partial trace operation. Thus, the adversary’s
action is to perform some unitary V on Y ⊗Z , followed by a projection on P on Z .
To analyze the behavior of this scheme, we will first analyze the case when the randomizing
unitary U is drawn from the Haar measure over the unitary group U(Y), rather from a t-design.
We will show that this scheme is totally authenticating. Then, we will show that actually using a
O(1)-unitary design will suffice.
The crucial hammer we will need is a version of Levy’s Lemma:
Definition 20. A function f : U(d)→ R is η-Lipschitz if
sup
U1,U2∈U(d)
| f (U1)− f (U2)|
‖U1 −U2‖2 ≤ η.
Lemma 21 (Levy’s Lemma [MS09]). Let f : U(d)→ R be an η-Lipschitz function on the unitary group
of dimension d with mean E f . Then
Pr
(∣∣ f −E f ∣∣ ≥ δ) ≤ 4 exp(−Cdδ2
η2
)
where C = 2/9pi3 and the probability is over U drawn from the Haar measure on U(d).
7However, it is not an 8-design
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Another useful lemma we will need is the following, giving two formulas for averaging over
the (Haar measure of the) unitary group. We use δij to denote the Dirac delta function that is 1 if
i = j and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 22 (Appendix B.5 of [Bee97]). For a function f : U(d) → R, we let 〈 f 〉 to denote ∫ f (U) dU,
where
∫ ·dU is integration over the Haar measure on U(d). Then
〈UabUijU∗a′b′U∗i′ j′〉 =
1
d2 − 1 (δaa′δbb′δii′δjj′ + δai′δbj′δia′δjb′)
− 1
d(d2 − 1) (δaa′δbj′δii′δjb′ + δai′δbb′δia′δjj′)
8.2 Total authentication with Haar-random unitaries
We now prove that the unitary design scheme yields total authentication. LetΛU = 〈0|⊗sU†VU|0〉⊗s
is be a map fromM⊗Z toM⊗Z .
Lemma 23. Let N = dim(Y). For all δ > 0, for all initial message states |ρ〉MZ have that
Pr
U
(‖ΓV |ρ〉 −ΛU |ρ〉‖22 ≥ 2−s + δ) ≤ exp(−C′Nδ2)
where ΓV = TrY (V)/ dim(Y), C′ is a universal constant, and U is a Haar-random unitary.
Remark 24. Again, as before, we will omit mention of the sender/receiver’s private space S , and
treat it as part of the adversary’s private space Z . The ideal adversary we construct will act as the
identity on S .
Proof. First, we write |ρ〉MY = ∑x ρx|x〉M ⊗ |ϕx〉Z where {|x〉} is a basis forM, and {|ϕx〉} are
arbitrary unit vectors in Z .
Write U as the following:
U =∑
u,x
|ψu,x〉〈u, x|
where |u〉 ∈ T , |x〉 ∈ M are standard basis vectors, and {|ψu,x〉} ⊂ T ⊗M is a set of orthonormal
unit vectors. Then U|0〉⊗s becomes a linear operator that accepts vectors inM and outputs vectors
in Y = T ⊗M:
U|0〉⊗s =∑
x
|ψ0s,x〉〈x|
We will simply write |ψx〉 to denote |ψ0s,x〉. We can write ΛU as
ΛU = ∑
x,x′
|x′〉〈x| 〈ψx′ |V|ψx〉.
Let’s compute the average operator∫
ΛU dU = ∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′|
∫
〈ψx|V|ψx′〉 dU (21)
=∑
x
|x〉〈x|
∫
〈ψx|V|ψx〉 dU + ∑
x 6=x′
|x〉〈x′|
∫
〈ψx|V|ψx′〉 dU (22)
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=∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
dim(Y)TrY (V) (23)
= IM ⊗ ΓV (24)
The second term in (22) (the sum over off-diagonal elements) averages to 0, because for x 6= x′, the
vectors |ψx′〉 and |ψx〉 are random orthogonal unit vectors. Conditioned on a fixing of |ψx〉, for any
vector |ϕ〉 that is orthogonal to |ψx〉, |ψx′〉 is equally likely to be |ϕ〉 or−|ϕ〉, so
∫ 〈ψx′ |V|ψx〉 dU =
0.
In the last step we used the fact that given an operator X mapping Y ⊗Z to Y ⊗Z , if we aver-
age over the unit sphere,
∫
(〈ψ|Y ⊗ IZ )X(|ψ〉Y ⊗ IZ ) dψ is equal to the partial trace TrY (X)/ dim(Y).
We’ll let N denote dim(Y).
Thus, this tells us that on average, this operator should act as the identity on M and some
linear map (not necessarily unitary) ΓV on Z . We now prove that ΛU behaves this way on |ρ〉with
high probability. Define
f (U) = ‖ΓV |ρ〉 −ΛU |ρ〉‖22.
Bounding the average of f . Expanding f and averaging, we get∫
f (U) dU =
∫ (〈ρ|Γ†V − 〈ρ|Λ†U)(ΓV |ρ〉 −ΛU |ρ〉) dU (25)
=
∫
〈ρ|Γ†VΓV |ρ〉 − 〈ρ|Λ†UΓV |ρ〉 − 〈ρ|Γ†VΛU |ρ〉+ 〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉 dU (26)
= −〈ρ|Γ†VΓV |ρ〉+
∫
〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉 dU (27)
where in the last line we used our calculation of
∫
ΛU dU above. We bound this last term. We
have that
ΛU |ρ〉 = ∑
x,x′
ρx′ |x〉 〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)
Thus ∫
〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉 dU =
∫
∑
x,x′,x′′
ρx′ρ
∗
x′′(〈ψx′′ | ⊗ 〈ϕx′′ |)V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉) dU (28)
=∑
x′
|ρx′ |2∑
x
∫
(〈ψx′ | ⊗ 〈ϕx′ |)V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉) dU (29)
=∑
x′
|ρx′ |2∑
x
∫ ∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∥∥22 dU (30)
=∑
x′
|ρx′ |2 ∑
x 6=x′
∫ ∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∥∥22 dU+ (31)
∑
x
|ρx|2
∫ ∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉)∥∥22 dU. (32)
Let {|z〉} be a basis for Z . Now notice that∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∥∥22 = ∥∥∑
z
|z〉〈z|Z 〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)
∥∥2
2 (33)
=∑
z
∣∣(〈ψx| ⊗ 〈z|)V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∣∣2. (34)
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Write |ϕ′x〉 = ∑z βx′z|z〉. Then we have
∣∣(〈ψx| ⊗ 〈z|)V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∣∣2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′ βx′z′(〈ψx| ⊗ 〈z|)V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |z′〉)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(35)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′ βx′z′∑ij V(i,z),(j,z′)U∗ixUjx′
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(36)
= ∑
z′,z′′
βx′z′β
∗
x′z′′ ∑
iji′ j′
V(i,z),(j,z′)V
∗
(i′,z),(j′,z′′)Ui′xUjx′U
∗
ixU
∗
j′x′ (37)
where the rows and columns of V are indexed by (i, z) and (j, z′), respectively. Again, we identify
|ψx〉 as the x’th column of U, and Uix denotes the i’th entry of |ψx〉.
We now go back to bound the sum over x 6= x′ in (32). Fix x, x′ such that x 6= x′. Substitut-
ing (37) in and using Lemma 22, we get:∫ ∥∥〈ψx′ |V(|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∥∥22 dU (38)
=
∫
∑
z,z′,z′′
βx′z′β
∗
x′z′′ ∑
iji′ j′
V(i,z),(j,z′)V
∗
(i′,z),(j′,z′′)Ui′xUjx′U
∗
ixU
∗
j′x′ dU (39)
= ∑
z′,z′′
βx′z′β
∗
x′z′′
[
1
N2 − 1∑ijz
V(i,z),(j,z′)V
∗
(i,z),(j,z′′) −
1
N(N2 − 1)∑ii′z
V(i,z),(i,z′)V
∗
(i′,z),(i′,z′′)
]
(40)
=
N
N2 − 1 −
1
N(N2 − 1) ∑z′,z′′
βx′z′β
∗
x′z′′∑
ii′z
V(i,z),(i,z′)V
∗
(i′,z),(i′,z′′) (41)
=
N
N2 − 1 −
1
N(N2 − 1)∑z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(42)
≤ N
N2 − 1 (43)
where we used the fact that V is unitary and that ∑z′ |βx′z′ |2 = 1. Summing (43) over all x 6= x′,
we get
∑
x′
|ρx′ |2 ∑
x 6=x′
∫ ∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉)∥∥22 dU ≤∑
x′
|ρx′ |2 ∑
x 6=x′
N
N2 − 1 =
N(M− 1)
N2 − 1 .
Now fix an x; we bound the second term of (32). Using Lemma 22 again, we have∫ ∥∥〈ψx|V(|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉)∥∥22 dU (44)
= ∑
z,z′,z′′
βxz′β
∗
xz′′
∫
∑
iji′ j′
V(i,z),(j,z′)V
∗
(i′,z),(j′,z′′)Ui′xUjx′U
∗
ixU
∗
j′x′ dU (45)
=
[
1
N2 − 1 −
1
N(N2 − 1)
]
·
∑
z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ N
 (46)
=
1
N(N + 1)
·
∑
z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ N
 (47)
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Putting everything together, we can bound (32) by
∫
〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉 dU ≤
N(M− 1)
N2 − 1 +
1
N(N + 1)
·
∑
z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ N
 (48)
=
NM− 1
N2 − 1 +
1
N(N + 1)∑z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (49)
We have to compare this to 〈ρ|Γ†VΓV |ρ〉 = ‖ΓV |ρ〉‖22. We expand ΓV |ρ〉:
ΓV |ρ〉 = 1N TrY (V)|ρ〉 (50)
=
1
N ∑i,z
|z〉Z 〈i, z|V|i〉
(
∑
x,z′
ρxβxz′ |x〉M ⊗ |z′〉Z
)
(51)
=
1
N ∑x,z
ρx|x, z〉MZ
(
∑
i,z′
βxz′〈i, z|V|i, z′〉
)
(52)
=
1
N ∑x,z
ρx|x, z〉MZ
(
∑
i,z′
βxz′V(i,z),(i,z′)
)
(53)
So therefore
〈ρ|Γ†VΓV |ρ〉 =
1
N2 ∑z
∣∣∣∣∣∑z′,i βx′,z′V(i,z),(i,z′)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
This shows that our desired average of f is small:∫
f (U) dU ≤ NM− 1
N2 − 1 .
Bounding the Lipschitz constant of f . We compute the Lipschitz continuity of f in parts. Let
g(U) = 〈ρ|Γ†VΛU |ρ〉, where |ρ〉 = ∑x ρx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉. Expanding, we get
g(U) = 〈ρ|(IY ⊗ Γ†V)∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′| ⊗ 〈ψx|V|ψx′〉|ρ〉 (54)
= ∑
x,x′
ρ∗xρx′(〈ψx| ⊗ 〈ϕx|)Γ†VV(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉) (55)
=
(
∑
x
ρ∗x〈ψx| ⊗ 〈ϕx|
)
Γ†VV
(
∑
x
ρx|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉
)
(56)
= 〈θ|Γ†VV|θ〉 (57)
where we used that Γ†V is an operator that acts on Z only, and we define |θ〉 = ∑x ρx|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉.
Thus for two unitaries U, Û, we have∣∣g(U)− g(Û)∣∣ = ∣∣〈θ|Γ†VV|θ〉 − 〈θ̂|Γ†VV|θ̂〉∣∣ (58)
=
∣∣∣Tr(Γ†VV(|θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂|))∣∣∣ (59)
≤
∥∥∥Γ†VV∥∥∥∞ · ∥∥ |θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂| ∥∥1 (60)
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where in the inequality we used Ho¨lder’s inequality for matrices: Tr(AB) ≤ ‖A‖∞‖B‖1. Now,
the operator norm is submultiplicative, so ‖Γ†VV‖∞ ≤ ‖Γ†V‖∞ · ‖V‖∞ ≤ ‖Γ†V‖∞, because V is a
unitary and hence its operator norm is 1. But then ‖Γ†V‖∞ = 1N‖∑y 〈y|V|y〉‖∞ ≤ 1N ∑y ‖〈y|V|y〉‖∞,
because the operator norm satisfies the triangle inequality. Here, |y〉 is a basis element of Y , and
〈y|V|y〉 is an operator that maps Z to Z . For each y, we can bound ‖〈y|V|y〉‖∞ ≤ 1. This implies
that |g(U)− g(Û)| ≤ ‖|θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂|‖1.
Thus the Lipschitz constant of g can be bounded by
ηg ≤ sup
U,Û
2‖|θ〉 − |θ̂〉‖2
‖U − Û‖2
.
Since the columns of U, Û are |ψu,x〉 and |ψ̂u,x〉, the denominator ‖U − Û‖2 can be written as√
∑u,x ‖|ψu,x〉 − |ψ̂u,x〉‖22. Notice that the numerator only depends on the column vectors |ψ0s,x〉 =
|ψx〉 and |ψ̂0s,x〉 = |ψ̂x〉, so the denominator can be minimized to be
√
∑x ‖|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉‖22 without
affecting the numerator. The numerator can be bounded as
‖∑
x
ρx(|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉 − |ψ̂x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉)‖2 ≤∑
x
|ρx| · ‖|ψx〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉 − |ψ̂x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉‖2 (61)
≤
√
∑
x
|ρx|2∑
x
‖|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉‖22 (62)
=
√
∑
x
‖|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉‖22 (63)
where in the first line we used the triangle inequality, and in the second line we used Cauchy-
Schwarz. Thus the Lipschitz constant of g is at most 2.
Now we bound the Lipschitz continuity of h(U) = 〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉. We have that
h(U) = ∑
x,x′,x′′
ρx′ρ
∗
x′′(〈ψx′′ | ⊗ 〈ϕx′′ |)V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V(|ψx′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉) (64)
=∑
x
〈θ|V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V|θ〉 (65)
= Tr
(
∑
x
|ψx〉〈ψx|V|θ〉〈θ|V†
)
(66)
where |θ〉 is the same as above. Let ΠU = ∑x |ψx〉〈ψx|. Therefore
|h(U)− h(Û)| =
∣∣∣Tr(ΠUV|θ〉〈θ|V† −ΠÛV|θ̂〉〈θ̂|V†)∣∣∣ (67)
=
∣∣∣Tr(ΠUV (|θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂|)V† + (ΠU −ΠÛ)V|θ̂〉〈θ̂|V†)∣∣∣ (68)
≤
∥∥∥|θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂|∥∥∥
1
+
∣∣∣〈θ̂|V†(ΠU −ΠÛ)V|θ̂〉∣∣∣ (69)
≤
∥∥∥|θ〉〈θ| − |θ̂〉〈θ̂|∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥ΠU −ΠÛ∥∥∞ (70)
where in the first inequality we use that ΠU = ΠU ·ΠU is a projector, and that Tr(ΠX) ≤ ‖X‖1
for all operators X and −I ≤ Π ≤ I. The second term can be bounded by
∥∥ΠU −ΠÛ∥∥∞ =
∥∥∥∥∥∑x |ψ̂x〉〈ψx|+ (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψx| − |ψ̂x〉〈ψ̂x|
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
(71)
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=∥∥∥∥∥∑x (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψx|+ |ψ̂x〉(〈ψx| − 〈ψ̂x|)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
(72)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∑x (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψx|
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
+
∥∥∥∥∥∑x (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψ̂x|
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
(73)
= sup
|v〉
∥∥∥∥∥∑x (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψx|v〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ sup
|v〉
∥∥∥∥∥∑x (|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉)〈ψ̂x|v〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(74)
≤ sup
|v〉
∑
x
|〈ψx|v〉| ·
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉∥∥2 + sup|v〉 ∑x |〈ψ̂x|v〉| ·
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉∥∥2 (75)
≤ sup
|v〉
√
∑
x
|〈ψx|v〉|2∑
x
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉∥∥22 + sup|v〉
√
∑
x
|〈ψ̂x|v〉|2∑
x
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉∥∥22
(76)
≤ 2
√
∑
x
∥∥|ψx〉 − |ψ̂x〉∥∥22. (77)
Therefore the Lipschitz constant ηh of h is at most 4, so the Lipschitz constant η of f is at most 8.
Now we invoke Levy’s Lemma once more, and we obtain
Pr
(|‖ΓV |ρ〉 −ΛU |ρ〉‖22 − ∫ f (U) dU| ≥ δ) ≤ 4 exp(−CNδ2η2
)
(78)
≤ 4 exp (−C′M2/N) (79)
where δ = 2M/N and C′ is some universal constant.
8.3 Constructing the ideal oblivious adversary
Now we demonstrate that the map |ρ〉MZ 7→ ΓV |ρ〉MZ can be implemented by an ideal oblivious
adversary.
Consider the following ideal adversary, which given a state |σ〉YZ performs the following:
1. First, the adversary creates a maximally entangled state |Φ〉Y ′Y ′′ = 1√
N ∑y |yy〉
Y ′Y ′′ in new
registers Y ′ ⊗Y ′′.
2. It then applies the unitary V to half of |Φ〉Y ′Y ′′ that resides in Y ′, and the Z part of |σ〉YZ .
The state currently looks like:
1√
N
∑
y
(IY ⊗VZY ′)|σ〉YZ ⊗ |yy〉Y ′Y ′′ (80)
=
1√
N
∑
y
(IY ⊗ IY ′Y ′′ ⊗VZY ′)|σ〉YZ ⊗ |yy〉Y ′Y ′′ (81)
=
1√
N
∑
y,y′
(IY ⊗ 〈y′|Y ′VZY ′ |y〉Y ′)|σ〉YZ ⊗ |y′y〉Y ′Y ′′ (82)
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3. The adversary projects Y ′Y ′′ using the projector |Φ〉〈Φ|Y ′Y ′′ (and leaves the state unnormal-
ized):
1
N ∑y
(IY ⊗ 〈y|Y ′VZY ′ |y〉Y ′)|σ〉YZ ⊗ |Φ〉Y ′Y ′′
4. The adversary discards the Y ′Y ′′ register:
1
N ∑y
(IY ⊗ 〈y|Y ′VZY ′ |y〉Y ′)|σ〉YZ
This is precisely the state ΓV |σ〉YZ , and the adversary described above never touches the Y regis-
ter, so it is ideal.
8.4 Derandomizing the analysis using approximate unitary designs
The analysis of this scheme is nearly complete; however, the main missing component is that the
analysis above assumes that the authentication scheme uses a truly random unitary U to scramble
the message state and the tag. Unfortunately, sampling a truly random unitary on n qubits and
applying it is infeasible: only a vanishing fraction of unitaries are succinctly describable or are
efficiently computable.
The authentication scheme instead samples a unitary from a unitary design, discussed earlier.
These are efficiently sampleable, efficiently computable ensembles of unitaries that are pseudoran-
dom: they fool polynomials of low degree.
It won’t be necessary to present formal definitions of a unitary design; we will use them in a
black box manner. We will appeal to a general derandomization result of Low who proved that, if
one establishes a measure of concentration result for a low degree polynomial f that’s evaluated
on a Haar-random unitary, then it still satisfies (nearly) the same measure of concentration when
f is evaluated on a unitary drawn from an approximate t-design. More formally:
Theorem 25 ([Low09]). Let f : U(N)→ R be a polynomial of degree K. Let f (U) = ∑i αi Mi(U) where
Mi(U) are monomials and let α( f ) = ∑i |αi|. Suppose that f has probability concentration
Pr
U∼νHaar
(| f − µ| ≥ δ) ≤ C exp(−aδ2)
and let µ be an ε-approximate unitary t-design. Then
Pr
U∼µ
(| f − µ| ≥ δ) ≤ 1
δ2m
(
C
(m
a
)m
+ ε(α+ |µ|)2m
)
for integer m with 2mK ≤ t.
Furthermore, there exist efficient constructions of approximate t-unitary designs, for any t.
Theorem 26 ([BHH12]). For every ε, t, and n, there exists a finite set of unitaries Dε,t,n ⊂ U(N) for
N = 2n, and a probability distribution µε,t,n over Dε,t,n such that
1. µε,t,n is an ε-approximate t-unitary design.
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2. µε,t,n can be sampled from in poly(n, t, log 1/ε) time
3. Each unitary U ∈ Dε,t,n can be implemented by a quantum circuit acting on n qubits of size at most
O(n log(4t)2t9(2nt + log(1/ε))).
We combine these two theorems to prove our final result:
Theorem 27 (Restatement of Theorem 19). The unitary design scheme is efficiently computable, and is
2−s/2-totally authenticating.
Proof. Note that f (U) is a polynomial of degree 4 in the entries of U. We compute α( f ) by com-
puting α( f0), α(g), and α(h) where f0 = 〈ρ|Γ†VΓV |ρ〉 is a constant, g(U) = 〈ρ|Γ†VΛU |ρ〉, and
h(U) = 〈ρ|Λ†UΛU |ρ〉. Clearly, α( f ) ≤ α( f0) + 2α(g) + α(h).
Since f0 is a constant function, α( f0) is at most | f0| ≤ 1. We turn to g. Let {|x〉} be a basis for
M. Then for x, x′, define the operator Txx′ = 〈ϕx|Γ†VV|ϕx′〉 to be the linear operator that maps Y
to Y (recall that |ρ〉 = ∑x ρx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉). Then,
g(U) = ∑
x,x′
ρ∗xρx′〈ψx|Txx
′ |ψx′〉 (83)
= ∑
x,x′,y,y′
ρ∗xρx′Txx
′
yy′ U
∗
yxUy′x′ (84)
For every x, x′, y, y′, we have a distinct monomial U∗yxUy′x′ , and the corresponding coefficient is
ρ∗xρx′Txx
′
yy′ , which has absolute value at most 1. Therefore α(g) ≤ M2N2.
Now we turn to h(U). Recall that
h(U) = ∑
x′,x′′
ρ∗x′ρx′′∑
x
(〈ψx′ | ⊗ 〈ϕx′ |)V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V(|ψx′′〉 ⊗ |ϕx′′〉) (85)
= ∑
i,j,x′,x′′
ρ∗x′ρx′′U
∗
ix′Ujx′′∑
x
(〈i| ⊗ 〈ϕx′ |)V†|ψx〉〈ψx|V(|j〉 ⊗ |ϕx′′〉) (86)
where |ψx〉 = ∑i Uix|i〉, |ψx′〉 = ∑i Uix′ |i〉 and |ψx′′〉 = ∑j Ujx′′ |j〉. Define |τix′〉 = V|i〉 ⊗ |ϕx′〉 and
|τ jx′′〉 = V|j〉 ⊗ |ϕx′′〉. Then we have
h(U) = ∑
i,j,i′,j′
∑
x,x′,x′′
U∗ix′Ujx′′Ui′xU
∗
j′xρ
∗
x′ρx′′〈τix
′ |i′〉〈j′|τ jx′′〉 (87)
= ∑
i,j,i′,j′
∑
x,x′,x′′
U∗ix′Ujx′′Ui′xU
∗
j′xρ
∗
x′ρx′′∑
z
(τix
′
i′z )
∗ τ jx
′′
j′z (88)
where we alternatively write |τix′〉 = ∑z τix′i′z |i′, z〉 and |τ jx
′′〉 = ∑z τ jx
′′
j′z |j′, z〉. For every choice of
i, j, i′, j′, x, x′, x′′, we have a distinct monomial, and the associated coefficient has norm at most∣∣ρ∗x′ρx′′∑
z
(τix
′
i′z )
∗ τ jx
′′
j′z
∣∣2 ≤ (∑
z
|τix′i′z |2
)
·
(
∑
z
|τ jx′′j′z |2
)
≤ 1.
Thus α(h) is at most M3N4. This implies that α( f ) ≤ O(N7).
Now we are ready to leverage Theorems 25 and 26. in Lemma 23 we proved that function
f (U) = ‖ΓV |ρ〉 − ΓU |ρ〉‖22 has probability concentration
Pr
U∼νHaar
(| f − µ| ≥ δ) ≤ 4 exp(−CNδ2)
where C is a universal constant. Thus our parameters are:
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1. (Average of f ) µ = M/N
2. (Error in probability concentration) δ =
√
M/N
3. (Degree of f ) K = 4
4. (Probability concentration exponent) a = CN
5. (Norm of f ) α( f ) = O(N7)
We will set m = 1, ε = N−17, and t = 8.
By Theorem 26, there exists a distribution µε,t,n over unitaries acting on n qubits that forms
an efficiently computable ε-approximate t-unitary design. Then, plugging everything into Theo-
rem 25, we have that
Pr
U∼µε,t,n
( f ≥ M/N +√M/N) ≤ O(1/M) (89)
Note that M/N = 2−s.
9 A lifting theorem for authentication
We will prove a lifting theorem which shows that a weak form of authentication security that
doesn’t take into account quantum side information actually implies stronger security against
quantum side information. The initial weak form of security is very weak indeed: as long as we
have the authentication scheme can securely authenticate a single state (namely, one half of the
maximally entangled state), in a key-averaged manner, then we can actually obtain an authentica-
tion scheme that can authenticate all states — even those that are entangled with the adversary.
Specifically, we show that this weak authentication security implies the security definition
of [DNS12], which we reproduce here:
Definition 28 ([DNS12] security definition). An authentication scheme (Auth,Ver) is ε-secure accord-
ing to the [DNS12] definition iff for all initial message states |ρ〉MSZ , for all adversariesO ∈ T(YZ ,YZ),
there exists an oblivious adversary I such that the following are ε-close in trace distance:
• (Real experiment) Ek [Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk] (ρMSZ )
• (Ideal experiment) I(ρMSZ )
where Authk acts onM, Verk acts on Y , and both act as the identity on SZ .
The difference between this definition and total authentication is that the key is averaged over
in the [DNS12] definition.
There is a minor caveat: we do not prove this implication for all authentication schemes.
Instead, we prove it for authentication schemes composed with a Pauli randomization step. If
(Auth,Ver) is an authentication scheme, we call this composed scheme Pauli+ (Auth,Ver), and it
behaves as follows:
The secret key for Pauli + (Auth,Ver) consists of the key k for (Auth,Ver), as well as a new,
independent key k′. The procedure to authenticate a message registerM behaves as follows: first,
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the key k′ is used to choose a random unitary from the Pauli group that acts on the spaceM.8 We
call this the Pauli randomization step. Next, the key k is used to apply Authk to the register M to
produce a state in the Y register. This is the authenticated state, which is then subject to attack by
the adversary.
To un-authenticate, the Verk procedure is applied. Note that this is not a unitary operation, but
includes the projection on the receiver’s acceptance (see the Preliminaries for a discussion of this).
Finally, the Pauli randomization is undone using the key k′.
Theorem 29 (Lifting weak authentication to total authentication). Let (Auth,Ver) be an authentica-
tion scheme, and suppose the composed scheme Pauli+ (Auth,Ver) satisfies the following security guaran-
tee: for all adversaries O ∈ T(YZ ,YZ), for all adversary ancilla qubits |θ〉ZZ ′ , there exists an oblivious
adversary I acting on Z only such that the following are ε-close in trace distance:
• (Real experiment) Ek,k′
[
Pauli†k′ ◦ Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk ◦ Paulik′
]
(|Φ〉〈Φ|MB ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|ZZ ′)
• (Ideal experiment) |Φ〉〈Φ|MB ⊗ I(|θ〉〈θ|ZZ ′)
where B is a Hilbert space isomorphic toM, and |Φ〉MB is the maximally entangled state.
Then, the composed scheme Pauli+ (Auth,Ver) is a ε-secure according to the [DNS12] definition.
Proof. We wish to argue that Pauli+ (Auth,Ver) is secure according to the [DNS12] definition. To
that end, let |ρ〉MSZ be a state that is entangled with the adversary, and let O ∈ T(YZ ,YZ) be an
arbitrary adversary.
Real experiment. Consider an execution of the Pauli+ (Auth,Ver) protocol on input ρ with ad-
versary O. We can represent this execution as a channel that takes in three registers (Z ,M, and
S), and outputs the same three registers. Recall that the Ver operation is not a unitary, because
we project on the protocol accepting (see the Preliminaries for a discussion of this). This channel
is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1, where time advances left to right. We call this ex-
ecution the Real Experiment. Our goal is to conclude that the output of the Real Experiment is
approximately the result of an ideal adversary.
The final state of the Real Experiment is
E
k,k′
(Pauli†k′ ◦ Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk ◦ Paulik′)
(
ρZMS
)
. (90)
8For simplicitly let us think ofM as (C2)⊗n (i.e., n qubits). Then the Pauli group consists of all operators of the form
XpZq, where p, q ∈ {0, 1}n. Here, the operator Xp is defined to be the tensor product of Xpjj , where Xj is the X Pauli
operator acting on the j’th qubit. Zq is defined similarly.
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Figure 1: Real Experiment
Hybrid 1. Next we argue that the intput and output behavior of the real protocol is indistinguish-
able from the next protocol, demonstrated in Figure 2. Here, inside the protocol, instead of first
authenticating the M part of ρ, the protocol introduces an ancillary maximally entangled state
|Φ〉AB two new registers A, B, where both A and B are isomorphic toM. The protocol then tele-
ports ρM from registerM to register A by making a Bell measurement on theM and B registers.
Figure 2: Hybrid 1
The teleportation sub-circuit is implemented by first making a Bell measurement on the BM
registers. After the measurement, the A register now contains the density matrix ρM, conjugated
by a Pauli error XpZq that depend on the outcomes (p, q) of the Bell measurement. We can write
the state of the ZAS registers as follows:
E
k,k′,p,q
PauliAp,q(ρZAS )
where Paulip,q(ρ) = XpZq(ρ)(XpZq)†. Note that the outcomes p and q are independent of k and k′.
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Subsequently, the outcomes (p, q) are used to apply the correction Pauli†p,q.9 After this Pauli
correction, the effect of the teleportation process is to have swapped the registersM and A. The
residual entangled state on registers BM is now some Bell basis state, which we ignore for the
rest of the protocol. The state ρZAS undergoes the Real Experiment protocol, so therefore the final
state of Hybrid 1 is going to be identical to the output state of the Real Experiment in (90) (up to
relabeling of registers):
E
k,k′,p,q
(Pauli†k′ ◦ Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk ◦ Paulik′)
(
ρZAS
)
. (91)
Although the measurement outcomes p and q are not used inside the expectation, we still keep
track of them (as will be useful in the next Hybrid).
Hybrid 2. We can rewrite the final state of Hybrid 1 in the following way:
E
k,k′,p,q
(Pauli†k′⊕(p,q) ◦ Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk ◦ Paulik′⊕(p,q))
(
ρZAS
)
.
This is because the distribution k′ and k′ ⊕ (p, q) are identical, and these random strings are inde-
pendent of k. But observe that this final state corresponds to the protocol diagrammed in Figure 3,
where the Pauli corrections are not done immediately after the Bell measurement, but rather de-
ferred to after the Paulik′ operation.
Figure 3: Hybrid 2
Hybrid 3. But since the Pauli corrections happen after the verification procedure, the Bell measure-
ment commutes with Authk, the attackO,the verification procedure Verk, and Paulik′ . Therefore we
can push the Bell measurement to just right before the Pauli corrections, as in Figure 4. But now
observe that the state of the protocol, right up to the vertical dashed line, can be written as follows:
E
k,k′
(Pauli†k′ ◦ Verk ◦ O ◦ Authk ◦ Paulik′)(|Φ〉〈Φ|AB ⊗ ρZMS )
9In Figure 2, we combine the Pauli correction with the Pauli operation that is part of the authentication scheme into
one operator. Note that this merged Pauli operator is Paulik′Pauli
†
p,q = −Paulik′⊕(p,q). The overall phase is immaterial.
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where the sequence of operations Pauli†k′ ◦Verk ◦ O ◦Authk ◦ Paulik′ only interact with theA and Z
registers.
Figure 4: Hybrid 3
The state up to that point looks like the sender authenticated theA half of maximally entangled
state |Φ〉AB using the secret keys k, k′, and kept the other half. The adversary then applies an attack
O on the authentication of ΦA, as well the Z part of ρ (which is unentangled with Φ). After the
adversary’s attack, the message register undergoes the verification procedure.
But this is precisely the situation we are assuming we have a security guarantee about. Thus
there exists an ideal oblivious adversary I acting on Z only such that the state of the protocol
(averaged over k, k′), up to the vertical dashed line, is ε-close to
|Φ〉〈Φ|AB ⊗ I(ρZMS ).
The teleportation circuit is then applied to this state. The final state of Hybrid 4 is therefore ε-close
to
I(ρZAS )
where we have traced out the BM registers. However this implies that the final state of the Real
Experiment must be ε-close to I(ρZAS ).
We have thus proved that Pauli+ (Auth,Ver) is a ε-secure according to the [DNS12] definition
of security. This finishes the proof.
We remark that this proof strategy is heavily inspired by the reduction given in [HLM11].
10 Open problems
We close with some open problems:
1. Is three-wise independence necessary for the Wegman-Carter scheme to be quantumly se-
cure?
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2. We showed that the Auth-QFT-Auth scheme achieves total authentication (with outer key
leakage) when the inner authentication scheme is instantiated with the Wegman-Carter scheme
using threewise-independent hashing. Can one show that Auth-QFT-Auth achieves total au-
thentication when both inner and outer authentication schemes are arbitrary authentication
schemes secure relative to the computational basis?
3. We showed that the scheme based on unitary 8-design achieves total authentication. Can one
show the same for unitary 2-designs? Does the Clifford scheme achieve total authentication?
4. Under what circumstances can the key be reused in any of the protocols presented in this
paper, when the receiver rejects the state? For example, we conjecture that in the unitary
design protocol, much of the key can be reused.
5. Our security definitions are specific to “one-time” authentication schemes (although the key
reuse properties allow multiple uses). Are there natural “many-time” versions of our secu-
rity definitions?
6. Does total authentication satisfy Universally Composable security (as defined in [BHL+05,
Unr10])?
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